Multiple-Conclusion Logics PART 1: "Remarkable Phenomena"

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Uni-Log 2005

Montreux, CH

Introductory (and Motivational) Course



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
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A case for a new **mother-structure**?

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Disadvantage:

• difficult interpretation of what's going on?

How to read or treat the inference Γ , $[\alpha_i]_{i \in I} \Vdash^m [\beta_j]_{j \in J}, \Delta$?

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Say that $\Lambda \subseteq S$ is \mathcal{L} -trivializing in case $(\forall \Upsilon \subseteq S) \Lambda \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \Upsilon$. In case $\Lambda = \{\lambda\}$, the sentence λ is said to be *refuted* by \mathcal{L} .

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Moore closure:

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overlap

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 $\begin{array}{ll} (\mathsf{C1}) & \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^{\Vdash} \\ (\mathsf{C2}) & (\Gamma^{\vdash})^{\Vdash} \subseteq \Gamma^{\vdash} \end{array}$

overlap

full cut

Closure Operator:overlap(C1) $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^{||}$ overlap(C2) $(\Gamma^{||})^{||} \subseteq \Gamma^{||}$ full cut(C3) $\Gamma \subseteq \Lambda \Rightarrow \Gamma^{||} \subseteq \Lambda^{||}$ dilution

Glossary:

- cut translates Gentzen's 'Schnitt'
- dilution translates Gentzen's 'Verdünnung'

Kuratowski (topological) closure: $(C1) \ \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^{||}$ overlap $(C2) \ (\Gamma^{||})^{||} \subseteq \Gamma^{||}$ full cut $(C3) \ \Gamma \subseteq \Lambda \Rightarrow \Gamma^{||} \subseteq \Lambda^{||}$ [derivable] $(CK1) \ (\Gamma \cup \Sigma)^{||} = \Gamma^{||} \cup \Sigma^{||}$ premise-apartness $(CK2) \ \varnothing^{||} = \varnothing$ no primitive theses

Tarski 1930 closure: (C1) $\Gamma \subset \Gamma^{\Vdash}$ overlap (C2) $(\Gamma^{||})^{||} \subseteq \Gamma^{||}$ full cut (C3) $\Gamma \subseteq \Lambda \implies \Gamma^{||} \subseteq \Lambda^{||}$ [derivable] dilution (CT1) $\Gamma^{\Vdash} = \bigcup \{ (\Gamma_{\Phi})^{\Vdash} : \Gamma_{\Phi} \in \mathsf{Fin}(\Gamma) \}$ finitariness (CT2) $|\mathcal{S}| \leq \aleph_0$ denumerable language (CT3) $\perp^{\Vdash} = S$, for some $\perp \in S$ ex falso where $Fin(\Gamma) = \{\Gamma_{\Phi} : \Gamma_{\Phi} \text{ is a finite subset of } \Gamma\}$

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Closure Systems and single-conclusion CRs

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
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



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
Gerhard Gentzen 1934-35: Natural Deduction, Sequents
Rudolf Carnap 1943, Karl Popper 1947ff
>>> William Kneale 1956 >>> Ian Hacking 1979
Dana Scott 1971 & 1974
D. J. Shoesmith and Timothy J. Smiley 1978

But what is **multiple-conclusion** good for?













 $\alpha \wedge \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$





 $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$ $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$







 $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$ $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$

 $\alpha,\beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \wedge \beta$

Multiple-Conclusion Logics -p.8/17







 $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$ $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$

 $\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \vee \beta$

 $\alpha,\beta\Vdash^{\mathbf{s}}\alpha\wedge\beta$






 $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$ $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$


 $\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \beta$ $\beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \beta$

 $\alpha,\beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \wedge \beta$

Multiple-Conclusion Logics -p.8/17




 $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$ $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$



 $\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \beta$ $\beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \beta$

 $\alpha,\beta\Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}\alpha\wedge\beta$

 $\alpha \lor \beta \Vdash^{s} ??$



 $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha$ $\alpha \land \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$

 $\alpha,\beta\Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}\alpha\wedge\beta$

 $\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} & & T & T & F \\ \hline T & T & T & T \\ \hline F & T & F \\ \hline \end{array}$


 $\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \beta$ $\beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \beta$


 $\alpha \lor \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} ??$

but


 $\alpha \lor \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \alpha, \beta$

Multiple-Conclusion Logics – p.8/17






 $\alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$




$$\alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$$

$$\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha \implies \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha$$
, or



$$\alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$$


$$\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha \quad \Rightarrow \ \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha, \text{ or}$$
$$\Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \sim \alpha$$





$$\alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta \qquad \text{while, with } \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}},$$

$$\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha \quad \Rightarrow \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha, \text{ or } \qquad \alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}}$$

$$\Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \sim \alpha$$








$$\begin{array}{ll} \alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta & \text{while, with } \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}}, \\ \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha & \Rightarrow \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha, \text{ or } & \alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \\ \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \sim \alpha & \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \sim \alpha, \alpha \end{array}$$

or, more simply,

 $\Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \alpha \quad \Rightarrow \quad \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}}$




$$\alpha, \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \beta \qquad \qquad \text{while, with } \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}},$$


$$\alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha \quad \Rightarrow \ \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \sim \alpha, \text{ or}$$
$$\Vdash^{\mathsf{s}} \alpha \lor \sim \alpha$$

 $\begin{array}{l} \alpha,\sim\!\!\alpha\Vdash^{\mathsf{m}}\\ \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}}\sim\!\!\alpha,\alpha\end{array}$


or, more simply,

$$\Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \alpha \implies \sim \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \alpha \\ \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \implies \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \sim \alpha$$







$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \beta, \Delta \quad \Rightarrow \quad \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta$



$\begin{array}{rcl} \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \beta, \Delta & \Rightarrow & \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta \\ \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha, \Delta \text{ and } \Gamma', \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta' & \Rightarrow & \Gamma', \Gamma, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta, \Delta' \end{array}$




$$\begin{split} & \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \beta, \Delta \quad \Rightarrow \quad \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta \\ & \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha, \Delta \text{ and } \Gamma', \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta' \quad \Rightarrow \quad \Gamma', \Gamma, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta, \Delta' \\ & \text{If } \mathsf{k} = \mathsf{s} \text{, then } \Delta = \varnothing \text{ and } \Delta' \text{ is a singleton.} \end{split}$$




 $\begin{array}{cccc} \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \beta, \Delta & \Rightarrow & \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta \\ \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha, \Delta \text{ and } \Gamma', \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta' & \Rightarrow & \Gamma', \Gamma, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta, \Delta' \end{array}$

If k = s, then $\Delta = \emptyset$ and Δ' is a singleton. But then the above rules characterize only intuitionistic implication!




 $\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \beta, \Delta \quad \Rightarrow \quad \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta$ $\Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha, \Delta \text{ and } \Gamma', \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta' \quad \Rightarrow \quad \Gamma', \Gamma, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta, \Delta'$


If $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{s}$, then $\Delta = \emptyset$ and Δ' is a singleton. But then the above rules characterize only intuitionistic implication! Alternatively, for the classical implication, one could take:



 $\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{k} \beta, \Delta \implies \Gamma \Vdash^{k} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta$ $\Gamma \Vdash^{k} \alpha, \Delta \text{ and } \Gamma', \beta \Vdash^{k} \Delta' \implies \Gamma', \Gamma, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{k} \Delta, \Delta'$ If k = s, then $\Delta = \emptyset$ and Δ' is a singleton. But then the above rules characterize only intuitionistic implication! Alternatively, for the classical implication, one could take: $\Gamma, \alpha, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{m} \beta, \Delta$



 $\begin{array}{rcl} \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \beta, \Delta & \Rightarrow & \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta \\ \Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \alpha, \Delta \text{ and } \Gamma', \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta' & \Rightarrow & \Gamma', \Gamma, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{k}} \Delta, \Delta' \\ \text{If } \mathsf{k} = \mathsf{s}, \text{ then } \Delta = \varnothing \text{ and } \Delta' \text{ is a singleton. But then} \\ \text{the above rules characterize only intuitionistic implication!} \\ \text{Alternatively, for the classical implication, one could take:} \\ \Gamma, \alpha, \alpha \supset \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \beta, \Delta \\ \Gamma, \beta \Vdash^{\mathsf{m}} \alpha \supset \beta, \Delta \end{array}$



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For any given logic $\mathcal{L}_{\triangleright} = \langle \mathcal{S}, \triangleright \rangle$

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 $(\Gamma \blacktriangleright \Delta)$ iff $(\Delta \rhd \Gamma)$.

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Similarly,

given rules for some $\overline{\wedge}$: $\alpha, \beta \triangleright \alpha \overline{\wedge} \beta$ $\alpha \overline{\wedge} \beta \triangleright \alpha$ $\alpha \overline{\wedge} \beta \triangleright \beta$

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 $\triangleright \overline{\sim} \alpha, \alpha$

we can consider their duals for \leq :

 $\alpha \trianglelefteq \beta \blacktriangleright \beta, \alpha$

$$\alpha \blacktriangleright \alpha \stackrel{\vee}{=} \beta$$

$$\beta \blacktriangleright \alpha \lor \beta$$

we can consider their duals for \sim :

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 $\triangleright \overline{\sim} \alpha, \alpha$

And so on...

we can consider their duals for \leq :

 $\alpha \lor \beta \blacktriangleright \beta, \alpha$

$$\alpha \blacktriangleright \alpha \stackrel{\vee}{\scriptstyle{\scriptstyle{\frown}}} \beta$$


$$\beta \blacktriangleright \alpha \lor \beta$$

we can consider their duals for \sim :

- $\blacktriangleright \alpha, \underline{\sim} \alpha$
- $\alpha,\underline{\sim}\alpha\blacktriangleright$

\wedge	T	F_2	F_1	F	
T	T	F_2	F_1	F	
F_2	F_2	F_2	F	F	
F_1	F_1	F	F_1	F	
F	F	F	F	F	

\vee	$T \mid F_2$		F_1	F
Т	T	T	T	T
F_2	T F_2		Т	F_2
F_1	T	T	F_1	F_1
F	T	F_2	F_1	F



∧	Т	F_2	F_1	F	\vee	Т	F_2	F_1	F		\sim
	T	F_2	F_1	F	T	T	T	T	T	T	F
F_2	F_2	F_2	F	F	F_2	T	F_2	Т	F_2	F_2	F_1
F_1	F_1	F	F_1	F	F_1	T	T	F_1	F_1	F_1	F_2
F	F	F	F	F	F	T	F_2	F_1	F	F	T

(Notice that there is no *single* redundant value!)

\wedge	T	F_2	F_1	F	\vee	Т	F_2	F_1	F		\sim
T	T	F_2	F_1	F	T	T	T	T	T	T	F
F_2	F_2	F_2	F	F	F_2	T	F_2	Т	F_2	F_2	F_1
F_1	F_1	F	F_1	F	F_1	T	T	F_1	F_1	F_1	F_2
F	F	F	F	F	F	T	F_2	F_1	F	F	T

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It is easy to check that $\Vdash_{CL}^{s} = \models^{s}$,

\wedge	T	F_2	F_1	F		\vee	Т	F_2	F_1	F		\sim
T	T	F_2	F_1	F		T	T	T	T	T	T	F
F_2	F_2	F_2	F	F		F_2	T	F_2	Т	F_2	F_2	F_1
F_1	F_1	F	F_1	F		F_1	T	T	F_1	F_1	F_1	F_2
F	F	F	F	F	ſ	F	T	F_2	F_1	F	F	T

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It is easy to check that $\Vdash_{CL}^{s} = \models^{s}$, and $\Vdash_{CL}^{m} \supseteq \models^{m}$,

From Shoesmith & Smiley 1978

\wedge	T	F_2	F_1	F	\vee	Т	F_2	F_1	F		\sim
T	T	F_2	F_1	F	T	T	T	T	T	T	F
F_2	F_2	F_2	F	F	F_2	T	F_2	Т	F_2	F_2	F_1
F_1	F_1	F	F_1	F	F_1	T	T	F_1	F_1	F_1	F_2
F	F	F	F	F	F	T	F_2	F_1	F	F	T

(Notice that there is no *single* redundant value!)

It is easy to check that $\Vdash_{CL}^{s} = \models^{s}$, and $\Vdash_{CL}^{m} \supseteq \models^{m}$, but $\Vdash_{CL}^{m} \nsubseteq \models^{m} !$

\land	Т	F_2	F_1	F		\vee	T	F_2	F_1	F		\sim
T	T	F_2	F_1	F		T	T	T	T	T	T	F
F_2	F_2	F_2	F	F		F_2	T	F_2	T	F_2	F_2	F_1
F_1	F_1	F	F_1	F		F_1	T	T	F_1	F_1	F_1	F_2
F	F	F	F	F	ſ	F	T	F_2	F_1	F	F	T

(Notice that there is no *single* redundant value!)

It is easy to check that $\Vdash_{CL}^{s} = \models^{s}$, and $\Vdash_{CL}^{m} \supseteq \models^{m}$, but $\Vdash_{CL}^{m} \not\subseteq \models^{m}$! In particular, $\not\not=^{m} \sim \alpha, \alpha$. (though $\models^{m} \sim \alpha \lor \alpha$)

Given some S, here are the elements of a **(tarskian) interpretation** over it:

• *truth-values*: $\mathcal{V} (= \mathcal{D} \cup \mathcal{U})$

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- (canonical) notions of entailment ⊨^k_§
 locally associated to a valuation § ∈ Sem:

Given some S, here are the elements of a **(tarskian) interpretation** over it:

- *truth-values*: $\mathcal{V} (= \mathcal{D} \cup \mathcal{U})$
- designated and undesignated values: \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{U} , where $\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{U} = \emptyset$
- *valuations*, or *models*: total functions $\S : S \to V$
- *semantics:* any set Sem of valuations
- (canonical) notions of entailment ⊨^k_§ locally associated to a valuation § ∈ Sem:

 $\Gamma \vDash_{\S}^{\mathsf{s}} \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \S(\Gamma) \not\subseteq \mathcal{D} \text{ or } \S(\{\varphi\}) \not\subseteq \mathcal{U} \qquad (\mathsf{LE}^{\mathsf{s}})$

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m p.13}/17$$

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$$\Gamma \vDash_{\S}^{\mathsf{m}} \Delta \quad \text{iff} \quad \S(\Gamma) \not\subseteq \mathcal{D} \text{ or } \S(\Delta) \not\subseteq \mathcal{U} \qquad (\mathsf{LE}^{\mathsf{m}})$$

For the usual notions of *global entailment*:

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(Tarski 1936)

Multiple-Conclusion Logics -p.14/17

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$$\begin{split} \Gamma \vDash_{\mathsf{Sem}}^{\mathsf{s}} \varphi & \text{iff } (\forall \S \in \mathsf{Sem}) \ \Gamma \vDash_{\S}^{\mathsf{s}} \varphi & (\mathsf{GE}^{\mathsf{s}}) \\ & (\mathsf{Tarski 1936}) \\ \Gamma \vDash_{\mathsf{Sem}}^{\mathsf{m}} \Delta & \text{iff } (\forall \S \in \mathsf{Sem}) \ \Gamma \vDash_{\S}^{\mathsf{m}} \Delta & (\mathsf{GE}^{\mathsf{m}}) \end{split}$$

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A logic $\mathcal{L} = \langle \mathcal{S}, \Vdash \rangle$ is said to have an **adequate** tarskian interpretation whenever there is some \vDash_{Sem}^{k} , as above, such that $\Vdash = \vDash_{\text{Sem}}^{k}$.

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$$\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{s}}_{\ell} \subseteq \mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{s}}_{g} \qquad \qquad \mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{m}}_{\ell} \subseteq \mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{m}}_{g}$$

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Veritas? Quid est veritas? —Pontius Pilate (Joannes 18:38).

On discernment

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Equally bad!!

On discernment


What if everything is true?

Very bad, but... What if everything is false?

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Why all the **bias towards truth**?

In 1869, Jules Verne published *Autour de la Lune*. In 1959, *Luna* 3 photographed the far side of the Moon.



Veritas? Quid est veritas? —Pontius Pilate (Joannes 18:38).



 $\begin{aligned} \text{Call } \S \in \text{Sem dadaistic} \\ \text{ in case } \S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}. \end{aligned}$


Veritas? Quid est veritas? —Pontius Pilate (Joannes 18:38).

 $\begin{aligned} \text{Call } \S \in \text{Sem dadaistic} \\ \text{ in case } \S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}. \\ \text{Let Dada} = \{\S : \S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}\}. \end{aligned}$




Call $\S \in \mathsf{Sem} \mathsf{ dadaistic}$ in case $\S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}$. Let $\mathsf{Dada} = \{\S : \S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}\}.$

Call $\S \in$ Sem nihilistic in case $\S(S) \subseteq U_{\S}$.



Call $\S \in \mathsf{Sem}$ dadaistic in case $\S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}$. Let $\mathsf{Dada} = \{\S : \S(\mathcal{S}) \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\S}\}.$

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Note:



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
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


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
Note: $\begin{array}{ccc}

\not
end {s} & \mathcal{S} & \text{iff} & \S \in \text{Nihil} \\
\mathcal{S} \not \models_{\S} & \text{iff} &
\end{array}$



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When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:



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(i) dadaistic



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Semantical conditions:



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(i) dadaistic

Semantical conditions:

 $\mathcal{D}_i \neq \varnothing$ $\mathsf{Sem}_i \subseteq \mathsf{Dada}$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

(i) (ii) **dadaistic** nihilistic Semantical conditions: $\mathcal{D}_i \neq \varnothing$ Sem_i \subseteq Dada



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

 $\begin{array}{ll} ({\rm i}) & ({\rm ii}) \\ \textbf{dadaistic} & \textbf{nihilistic} \\ \hline \textbf{Semantical conditions:} \\ \mathcal{D}_{\rm i} \neq \varnothing & \mathcal{U}_{\rm ii} \neq \varnothing \\ \hline \textbf{Sem}_{\rm i} \subseteq \textsf{Dada} & \textsf{Sem}_{\rm ii} \subseteq \textsf{Nihil} \end{array}$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

 $\begin{array}{ll} (i) & (ii) & (iii) \\ \textbf{dadaistic} & \textbf{nihilistic} & \textbf{semitrivial} \\ \hline \textbf{Semantical conditions:} \\ \mathcal{D}_i \neq \varnothing & \mathcal{U}_{ii} \neq \varnothing \\ \hline \textbf{Sem}_i \subseteq \textsf{Dada} & \textsf{Sem}_{ii} \subseteq \textsf{Nihil} \end{array}$



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 $\begin{array}{lll} (i) & (ii) & (iii) & (iv) \\ \textbf{dadaistic} & \textbf{nihilistic} & \textbf{semitrivial} & \textbf{trivial} \\ \hline \\ \textbf{Semantical conditions:} \\ \mathcal{D}_{i} \neq \varnothing & \mathcal{U}_{ii} \neq \varnothing & \mathcal{D}_{iii} \neq \varnothing & \text{and} & \mathcal{U}_{iii} \neq \varnothing & -- \\ \hline \\ \textbf{Sem}_{i} \subseteq \textbf{Dada} & \textbf{Sem}_{ii} \subseteq \textbf{Nihil} & \textbf{Sem}_{iii} \subseteq \textbf{Dada} \bigcup \textbf{Nihil} & \textbf{Sem}_{iv} \subseteq \textbf{Dada} \cap \textbf{Nihil}(=\varnothing) \\ \hline \\ \textbf{Single-conclusion abstract characterizations:} \end{array}$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

(i) (ii) (iii) (iii) (iv) **dadaistic** nihilistic semitrivial trivial Semantical conditions: $\mathcal{D}_{i} \neq \emptyset$ $\mathcal{U}_{ii} \neq \emptyset$ $\mathcal{D}_{iii} \neq \emptyset$ and $\mathcal{U}_{iii} \neq \emptyset$ — Sem_i \subseteq Dada Sem_{ii} \subseteq Nihil Sem_{iii} \subseteq Dada \bigcup Nihil Sem_{iv} \subseteq Dada \cap Nihil(= \emptyset) Single-conclusion abstract characterizations: $(\forall \beta \Gamma)$

 $\Gamma \Vdash_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathsf{s}} \beta$



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 $\Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}_{\mathsf{i}} \beta \qquad \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}_{\mathsf{ii}} \beta$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

 $\Gamma \Vdash_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathbf{s}} \beta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\mathbf{ii}}^{\mathbf{s}} \beta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\mathbf{iii}}^{\mathbf{s}} \beta$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

 $\begin{array}{cccc} (i) & (ii) & (iii) & (iv) \\ \textbf{dadaistic} & \textbf{nihilistic} & \textbf{semitrivial} & \textbf{trivial} \\ \end{array} \\ \hline \textbf{dadaistic} & \textbf{nihilistic} & \textbf{semitrivial} & \textbf{trivial} \\ \hline \textbf{Semantical conditions:} \\ \mathcal{D}_{i} \neq \varnothing & \mathcal{U}_{ii} \neq \varnothing & \textbf{and} & \mathcal{U}_{iii} \neq \varnothing & -- \\ \hline \textbf{Sem}_{i} \subseteq \textbf{Dada} & \textbf{Sem}_{ii} \subseteq \textbf{Nihil} & \textbf{Sem}_{iii} \subseteq \textbf{Dada} \bigcup \textbf{Nihil} & \textbf{Sem}_{iv} \subseteq \textbf{Dada} \cap \textbf{Nihil}(=\varnothing) \\ \hline \textbf{Single-conclusion abstract characterizations:} \\ (\forall \beta \Gamma) & (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma) & (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma) & (\forall \beta \Gamma) \\ \Gamma \Vdash_{i}^{s} \beta & \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{ii}^{s} \beta & \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{ii}^{s} \beta & \Gamma \Vdash_{iv}^{s} \beta \end{array}$



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Multiple-conclusion abstract characterizations:



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

(iv)(i) (ii) (iii) dadaistic nihilistic semitrivial trivial Semantical conditions: $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing \qquad \qquad \mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing \qquad \mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing \quad \mathsf{and} \ \mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing$ $\mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{i}} \subseteq \mathsf{Dada} \quad \mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{ii}} \subseteq \mathsf{Nihil} \quad \mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{iii}} \subseteq \mathsf{Dada} \bigcup \mathsf{Nihil} \quad \mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{iv}} \subseteq \mathsf{Dada} \cap \mathsf{Nihil}(= \emptyset)$ *Single-conclusion* abstract characterizations: $(\forall \beta \Gamma) \qquad (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma) \qquad (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma)$ $(\forall \beta \Gamma)$ $\Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}_{\mathsf{i}} \beta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}_{\mathsf{ii}} \beta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}_{\mathsf{iii}} \beta$ $\Gamma \Vdash_{iv}^{s} \beta$ *Multiple-conclusion* abstract characterizations: $(\forall \beta \Gamma \Delta)$ $\Gamma \Vdash_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathsf{m}} \beta, \Delta$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
dadaistic	nihilistic	semitrivial	trivial
Semantical c	onditions:		
$\mathcal{D}_i \neq \varnothing$	$\mathcal{U}_{ii} eq arnothing$	$\mathcal{D}_{iii} eq arnothing$ and $\mathcal{U}_{iii} eq arnothing$	—
$Sem_{i} \subseteq Dada$	$Sem_{ii}\subseteqNihil$	$Sem_{iii} \subseteq Dada igcup Nihil$	$Sem_{iv} \subseteq Dada \cap Nihil(= \varnothing)$
Single-conclu	i <mark>sion</mark> abstract o	characterizations:	
$(orall eta \Gamma)$	$(\forall lpha eta \Gamma)$	$(orall lpha eta \Gamma)$	$(orall eta \Gamma)$
$\Gamma \Vdash^{\sf s}_{\sf i} \beta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{s}_{ii} \beta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\operatorname{III}}^{s} \beta$	$\Gamma \Vdash_{iv}^{s} \beta$
Multiple-con	clusion abstrac	t characterizations:	
$(\forall \beta \Gamma \Delta)$	$(\forall \alpha \Gamma \Delta)$		
$\Gamma \Vdash^{m}_{i} \beta, \Delta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{ii}^m \Delta$		



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

(iv)(i) (ii) (iii) dadaistic nihilistic semitrivial trivial Semantical conditions: $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing \qquad \qquad \mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing \qquad \mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing \quad \mathsf{and} \ \mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}\mathsf{i}} \neq \varnothing$ $\mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{i}} \subseteq \mathsf{Dada} \quad \mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{ii}} \subseteq \mathsf{Nihil} \quad \mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{iii}} \subseteq \mathsf{Dada} \bigcup \mathsf{Nihil} \quad \mathsf{Sem}_{\mathsf{iv}} \subseteq \mathsf{Dada} \cap \mathsf{Nihil}(= \emptyset)$ *Single-conclusion* abstract characterizations: $(\forall \beta \Gamma) \qquad (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma) \qquad (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma)$ $(\forall \beta \Gamma)$ $\Gamma \Vdash_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathbf{s}} \beta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\mathbf{ii}}^{\mathbf{s}} \beta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\mathbf{iii}}^{\mathbf{s}} \beta$ $\Gamma \Vdash^{\mathsf{s}}_{\mathsf{iv}} \beta$ *Multiple-conclusion* abstract characterizations: $(\forall \beta \Gamma \Delta) \qquad (\forall \alpha \Gamma \Delta) \qquad (\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma \Delta)$ $\Gamma \Vdash_{\mathbf{i}}^{\mathsf{m}} \beta, \Delta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\mathbf{ii}}^{\mathsf{m}} \Delta \qquad \Gamma, \alpha \Vdash_{\mathbf{iii}}^{\mathsf{m}} \beta, \Delta$



When the **nature** of inference does not really matter:

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Now, **compare**:

(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
dadaistic	nihilistic	semitrivial	trivial

Semantical conditions:

 $\begin{array}{lll} \mathcal{D}_{i} \neq \varnothing & \mathcal{U}_{ii} \neq \varnothing & \text{and} & \mathcal{U}_{iii} \neq \varnothing & & - \\ \text{Sem}_{i} \subseteq \text{Dada} & \text{Sem}_{ii} \subseteq \text{Nihil} & \text{Sem}_{iii} \subseteq \text{Dada} \bigcup \text{Nihil} & \text{Sem}_{iv} \subseteq \text{Dada} \cap \text{Nihil}(= \varnothing) \\ \hline \textit{Single-conclusion abstract characterizations:} \end{array}$

$(\forall \beta \Gamma)$	$(\forall lpha eta \Gamma)$	$(orall lpha eta \Gamma)$	$(\forall eta \Gamma)$
$\Gamma \Vdash^{\sf s}_{\sf i} \beta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{s}_{ii} \beta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{s}_{iii} \beta$	$\Gamma \Vdash^{s}_{iv} \beta$

Multiple-conclusion abstract characterizations:



Now, **compare**:

(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
dadaistic	nihilistic	semitrivial	trivial

Semantical conditions:

 $\mathcal{D}_{i} \neq \emptyset \qquad \mathcal{U}_{ii} \neq \emptyset \qquad \mathcal{D}_{iii} \neq \emptyset \text{ and } \mathcal{U}_{iii} \neq \emptyset \qquad -$ Sem_i \subseteq Dada Sem_{ii} \subseteq Nihil Sem_{iii} \subseteq Dada \bigcup Nihil Sem_{iv} \subseteq Dada \bigcap Nihil(= \emptyset) Single-conclusion abstract characterizations:

$(\forall \beta \Gamma)$	$(\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma)$	$(\forall \alpha \beta \Gamma)$	$(\forall \beta \Gamma)$
$\Gamma \Vdash^{s}_{i} \beta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{s}_{ii} \beta$	$\Gamma, \alpha \Vdash^{s}_{iii} \beta$	$\Gamma \Vdash^{s}_{iv} eta$

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Multiple-conclusion abstract characterizations:

Call a logic $\mathcal{L} = \langle \mathcal{S}, \vDash \rangle$ consistent in case:

- (1) \mathcal{L} is non-dadaistic (i.e., $Sem_{\mathcal{L}} \not\subseteq Dada$)
- (2) S is \mathcal{L} -trivializing

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Here is the **Paradox of Ineffable Inconsistencies**:

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HOW?

Call a logic $\mathcal{L} = \langle \mathcal{S}, \vDash \rangle$ consistent in case: (1) \mathcal{L} is non-dadaistic (i.e., $\operatorname{Sem}_{\mathcal{L}} \not\subseteq \operatorname{Dada}$) (2) \mathcal{S} is \mathcal{L} -trivializing (i.e., $(\forall \Delta \subseteq \mathcal{S}) \mathcal{S} \vDash^{\mathsf{m}} \Delta$)

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HOW? Just **add** to $Sem_{\mathcal{L}}$ an arbitrary dadaistic valuation!