Type-Based Analysis of Generic Key Management APIs

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***Abstract*—In the past few years, cryptographic key management APIs have been shown to be subject to tricky attacks based on the improper use of cryptographic keys. In fact, real APIs provide mechanisms to declare the intended use of keys but they are not strong enough to provide key security. In this paper, we propose a simple imperative programming language for specifying strongly-typed APIs for the management of symmetric, asymmetric and signing keys. The language requires that type information is stored together with the key but it is independent of the actual low-level implementation. We develop a type-based analysis to prove the preservation of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive keys and we show that our abstraction is expressive enough to code realistic key management APIs.**

I. Introduction

In the recent years cryptography is becoming a key technology to provide security in various settings, and cryptographic hardware and services are becoming more and more pervasive in everyday applications. The interfaces to cryptographic devices and services are implemented as *Security APIs* whose main aim is to allow untrusted code to access resources in a secure way. Typically, these APIs provide *key management* operations such as: the creation or deletion of keys; the encryption/decryption, signing and verification of data trough some keys; the import/export of *sensitive* keys, i.e., keys that should never be revealed outside a smart card or hardware security modules (HSMs). These last operations are usually implemented by encrypting these sensitive keys under other keys, operation which is called *key wrapping*.

API calls may be executed on untrusted machines, thus a very important issue is to design security APIs that enforce a *policy*, that is, security properties have to be maintained no matter what the parameters are, and which sequence of legal API calls is executed. A *key usage* policy is defined by some *key attributes* stored in the key. Examples are the *wrap* attribute that is associated to keys used to encrypt other keys, or the attribute *decrypt* associated to decryption keys. Objects, such as e.g., cryptographic keys or certificates in tokens, are referenced via *handles*, that are pointers to or names for the objects in secure memory. Handles do not reveal any information about the actual values of the objects, e.g., of a key. Thus, objects may be used without necessarily knowing their values but just providing a handle to them. Although these APIs are very powerful, all the proposed implementations are not capable of precisely defining the different roles and uses object should have.

In the last decade this has lead to many different attacks both on HSMs and smart cards (see, e.g., [1], [2], [3], [7]). Many of these attacks are related to the key wrapping operation. For example, attacks on the IBM CCA interface are related to the improper bound, provided by the XOR function, between the attributes of a wrapping key and the usage rules [2], and attacks on the PKCS#11 security tokens can be mounted by assigning particular sets of attributes to the keys, and by performing particular sequences of (legal) API calls [3]. In this context some 'patches' have been presented and rely on: imposing a policy on the attributes so that a key cannot be used for conflicting operations; imposing that conflicting attributes are not set at two different instants by limiting to some non-critical functions the usage of imported keys [3], or by adding a wrapping format that binds attributes to wrapped keys [11], [13]. Other attacks on PIN processing APIs are, e.g., on formats used for message encryption [9], or on the lack of integrity of user data [6].

In our opinion, formal and general tools to reason about the security of cryptographic APIs are very important in order to find attacks to real APIs and to test new patches.

Our contribution: In this paper we present an abstract and simple imperative programming language for specifying strongly-typed APIs for the management of symmetric, asymmetric and signing keys. Starting from the definition of an abstract key management language which is strongly typed, i.e., that associates objects to types, we then provide a concrete semantics, in which concrete key properties are stored in place of types. We then investigate conditions that allow to map concrete APIs over the proposed types so that security results are preserved. In particular, we prove that if the translation of the concrete API to the typed one is well-typed than security of keys is guaranteed.

We then study realistic implementations of the APIs. We consider PKCS#11 v2.20 that allows to specify the attributes of wrapped and unwrapped keys [16]. We show that PKCS#11 attributes can be mapped into types preserving the above mentioned conditions, and this allows to prove security through the general type-checking.

Related work: The literature proposes different solutions for the designs of new secure token interfaces and the proofs of their security. In [4] secure token interfaces are proposed together with security proofs in the cryptographic model. The security relies on the access of a log of all the operations, solution that seems to be not very practical when applied, e.g., to limited memory devices. Moreover, it does not cover the set of all the possible security properties. In [10] secure token interfaces are proposed for a distributed setting, together with security proofs in the symbolic model. However, this approach assumes a limited set of functionalities. [14] introduces a general security model for cryptographic APIs: it defines a new notion of security for cryptographic APIs, and it applies this notion to the security proofs both in the symbolic and the computational model. This new model is able to separate key management from key usage, thus avoiding some of the previous attacks. It is also flexible enough to be adapted to some real security APIs. The main difference with respect to our proposal is the use that we do of types to statically enforce security properties on general APIs.

Our type system is partially inspired from the one in [12], proposed for the different setting of spi-calculus processes for protocol analysis. Apart from the completely different setting, there is another important technical difference with respect to [12]: here we do not assume any integrity check when performing encryption and decryption. When we decrypt with a wrong key we still get a valid term. This is what typically happen in many real implementations.

In [5] the authors propose a simple language, for the coding of PKCS#11 APIs, and they develop a type-based analysis to prove that the secrecy of sensitive keys is preserved under a certain policy. This solution, is however limited to PKCS#11 cryptographic APIs and to symmetric keys, whereas in this paper we propose a new language which is applicable general cryptographic APIs, that is, any key storage which is managed through handles, and manages also asymmetric and signing keys, in the style of [14]. As we will show we will be able to instantiate the PKCS#11 APIs in this new model.

The paper is organized as follows. In section II we introduce a simple imperative programming language for specifying strongly-typed APIs for the management of symmetric, asymmetric and signing keys, the attacker model and the notion of API security; in section III we present the type system that enforces API security and the type soundness; in section IV we modify the language in order to code real API implementations. In section V we show how PKCS#11 can be modeled in out framework. We conclude in section VI.

II. A LANGUAGE FOR KEY MANAGEMENT APIS

In this section we first introduce a simple imperative language suitable to specify key management APIs. We then formalize the attacker model and define API security. The API language is inspired from [5] but here we develop it around more expressive types for keys that dictate how key should be used and what is their security level. Moreover we consider asymmetric encryption and digital signatures which are not accounted for in [5].

Values: We let $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{G}$, with $\mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{G} = \emptyset$, respectively be the set of atomic *constant* and *fresh* values. The former is used to model any public data, including non-sensitive keys; the latter models the generation of new fresh values such as sensitive keys. We associate to $\mathcal{G}$ an extraction operator $g \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$, representing the extraction of the first 'unused' value g from $\mathcal{G}$. Extracted values are always different: two, even non-consecutive, extractions $g \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$ and $g' \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$ are always such that $g \neq g'$. We let val range over the set of all atomic values $\mathcal{C} \cup \mathcal{G}$ and we define values v as follows:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} v & ::= & val \mid enc(v, v') \mid dec(v, v') \\ & & \mid ek(v) \mid enc^a(v, v') \mid dec^a(v, v') \\ & & \mid vk(v) \mid sig(v, v') \end{array}$$

Intuitively, $enc(v, v')$ (resp. $enc^a(v, v')$) and $dec(v, v')$ (resp. $dec^a(v, v')$) denote value v respectively encrypted and decrypted under key v' in a symmetric (resp. asymmetric) cipher; $ek(v)$ denotes the public *encryption* key corresponding to the private *decryption* key v, $vk(v)$ is the *verification* key corresponding to the *signature* key v; finally, $sig(v, v')$ denotes the signature of v using key v'.

We explicitly represent decrypted values in order to model situations in which a wrong key is used to decrypt an encrypted value: for example, the decryption under v' of $enc(v, v')$ will give, as expected, value v; instead, the decryption under v' of $enc(v, v'')$, with $v'' \neq v'$ will be explicitly represented as $dec(enc(v, v''), v')$. This allows us to model cryptosystems with no integrity checks: decrypting with a wrong key never gives a failure. Signature verification, instead, only succeeds when the verification key corresponds to the signature one.

Expressions: Our language is composed of a core set of expressions for manipulating the above values. Expressions are based on a set of variables $\mathcal{V}$ ranged over by x, and have the following syntax:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} e & ::= & x \mid \mathsf{enc}(e, x) \mid \mathsf{dec}(e, x) \\ & & \mid \mathsf{ek}(x) \mid \mathsf{enc}^a(e, x) \mid \mathsf{dec}^a(e, x) \\ & & \mid \mathsf{vk}(x) \mid \mathsf{sig}(e, x) \mid \mathsf{ver}(e, x) \end{array}$$

A memory $\mathsf{M} : x \mapsto v$ is a partial mapping from variables to values and $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$ denotes that the evaluation of the expression e in memory M leads to value v. The semantics of expressions is defined inductively as in Table I. As already mentioned, the modeled encryption mechanism does not perform any integrity check on the messages, so the decryption of a ciphertext under a wrong key gives $dec(v'', v')$. Signature verification, instead, evaluates to the signed message only when the verification key corresponds to the signing key.

$$
\begin{array}{rll}
x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}(x) & & \text{if } \mathsf{M}(x) \text{ is defined} \\
\mathsf{e}(e_1,\ldots,e_n) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{e}(v_1,\ldots,v_n) & & \text{if } e_i \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v_i, i \in [1,n] \\
\mathsf{enc}(v,v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{enc}(v,v') & & \\
\mathsf{dec}(\mathit{enc}(v,v'),v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v & & \\
\mathsf{dec}(v'',v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{dec}(v'',v') & & \text{if } v'' \neq \mathit{enc}(v,v') \\
\mathsf{enc}^a(v,v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{enc}^a(v,v') & & \\
\mathsf{ek}(v) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{ek}(v) & & \\
\mathsf{dec}^a(\mathit{enc}^a(v,\mathit{ek}(v')),v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v & & \\
\mathsf{dec}^a(v'',v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{dec}^a(v'',v') & & \text{if } v'' \neq \mathit{enc}^a(v,\mathit{ek}(v')) \\
\mathsf{sig}(v,v') \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{sig}(v,v') & & \\
\mathsf{vk}(v) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathit{vk}(v) & & \\
\mathsf{ver}(\mathit{sig}(v,v'),\mathit{vk}(v')) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v & &
\end{array}
$$

Table I
THE SEMANTICS OF EXPRESSIONS



Figure 1. Security lattice

Types: Our language is designed around powerful types that specify the intended usage and the security level of each key. A security level is a pair $\ell_C\ell_I$ specifying, separately, the confidentiality (C) and integrity (I) levels. We consider two possible levels: *High* (H) and *Low* (L). For example, HH denotes a high confidentiality and high integrity value, while LH a public (low confidentiality) and high integrity one. Intuitively, high confidentiality values should never be read by opponents while high integrity values should not be modified by opponents, i.e., when high integrity data are received they are expected to be originated at some trusted source.

Figure 1 is a standard security lattice showing that confidentiality and integrity levels are contra-variant [15]. Moving up is safe while moving down is unsafe, thus it is safe to consider a public datum as secret, while it is unsafe promoting low integrity to high integrity. More formally, the confidentiality and integrity preorders are such that $L \sqsubseteq_C H$ and $H \sqsubseteq_I L$. We let ℓ_C and ℓ_I range over $\{L, H\}$, while we let ℓ range over the pairs $\ell_C\ell_I$ with $\ell_C^1\ell_I^1 \sqsubseteq \ell_C^2\ell_I^2$ iff $\ell_C^1 \sqsubseteq_C \ell_C^2$ and $\ell_I^1 \sqsubseteq_I \ell_I^2$.

We define the following types:

$$
\begin{array}{rcl}
T & ::= & X \mid \ell \mid \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] \\
\mu & ::= & \mathsf{Sym} \mid \mathsf{Enc} \mid \mathsf{Dec} \mid \mathsf{Sig} \mid \mathsf{Ver}
\end{array}
\qquad (1)
$$

Intuitively, X is a type variable that will be bounded at runtime by a map $\sigma : X \to T$ from type variables to ground types; type ℓ is for generic data at security level ℓ; and type $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ is for keys at security level ℓ that are used to perform cryptographic operations on terms of type T. Depending on the label μ, this type may describe symmetric keys, encryption/decryption asymmetric keys, or signing and verification keys. We will see that type information are stored, retrieved and checked at run-time in order to authorize specific cryptographic operations. Type variables allows for some degree of polymorphism so that static analysis can be performed on types that are partially specified. We write $var(T)$ to note the variables occurring in type T.

We allow symmetric, decryption and verification keys to have a payload different from LL only if their level is HH, i.e., when they can really be trusted.

Definition 1 (Types well-formedness)**.** *Let $T = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ with $\mu \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$. Then $\ell \neq HH$ implies $T = LL$.*

Given a type T we will use $\ell_C(T)$ and $\ell_I(T)$ to denote respectively its confidentiality and integrity levels. Let $\ell = \ell_C^\star\ell_I^\star$. Define $\ell_C(\ell) = \ell_C(\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]) = \ell_C^\star$ and $\ell_C(X) = H$; similarly $\ell_I(\ell) = \ell_C(\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]) = \ell_I^\star$ and $\ell_I(X) = L$.

We define the notion of subtyping , $\leq$, as the least preorder such that:

(1) $\ell_1 \leq \ell_2$ whenever $\ell_1 \sqsubseteq \ell_2$;
(2) $LL \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell_C L}[LL]$;
(3) $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] \leq \ell$ for any type T.

Intuitively, (1) states that subtyping extends the security level preorder; (2) public and low integrity (LL) terms are regarded as keys performing cryptographic operations on public and low integrity (LL) terms. For example, it is allowed to encrypt a LL term under a LL key; (3) keys can be thought as generic data at the same level. Notice that the opposite would be unsafe, apart from the special case of LL stated in item (2).

Lemma 2. *Let $\sigma : X \to T$ be a map from type variables to ground type. Then, $T \leq T'$ implies $T\sigma \leq T'\sigma$.*

Proof: Conditions (1) and (2) of $\leq$ are on ground types so $T\sigma = T \leq T' = T'\sigma$. Condition (3) we have $T = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] \leq \ell = T'$. In this case $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]\sigma = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T\sigma] \leq \ell = T' = T'\sigma$ ■

APIs and tokens: An API is specified as a set $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathsf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{a}_n\}$ of functions, each one composed of simple sequences of assignment commands:

$$
\begin{array}{rcl}
\mathsf{a} & ::= & \lambda x_1, \ldots, x_k.\mathsf{c} \\
\mathsf{c} & ::= & x := e \mid x := \mathsf{f} \mid \mathsf{return}\ e \mid \mathsf{c}_1; \mathsf{c}_2 \\
\mathsf{f} & ::= & \mathsf{getKey}(y, T) \mid \mathsf{genKey}(T) \mid \mathsf{setKey}(y, T)
\end{array}
$$

We will only consider API commands in which $\mathsf{return}\ e$ can only occur as the last command. Internal functions f represent operations that can be performed on the underlying devices. Note that these functions are used to implement the APIs and are not directly available to the users. Intuitively,

getKey retrieves the plaintext value of a key stored in the device, given its handle y; if the recorded (ground) type of the key is unifiable with T, the key is returned; any binding of type variables in T which is necessary to match the actual key type is recorded in a special environment σ; genKey generates a key with (ground) type $T\sigma$; finally, setKey imports a new key with plaintext value y and (ground) type $T\sigma$. The first function fails, i.e., is stuck, if the given handle does not exist or refers to a key with a non-matching type. The other function are stuck if the given type is not ground, once we apply the environment binding σ. A call to an API $\mathsf{a} = \lambda x_1, \ldots, x_k.\mathsf{c}$, written $\mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k)$, binds $x_1, \ldots, x_k$ to values $v_1, \ldots, v_k$, executes c and outputs the value given by $\mathsf{return}\ e$.

Example 3 (Symmetric key wrapping)**.** *We specify a wrapping API that takes two handles: the wrapped key h_key and the wrapping key h_w. If the wrapped key has the expected type then it is encrypted under the wrapping key and the ciphertext is returned. For the sake of readability, we will always write $\mathsf{a}(x_1, \ldots, x_k)\ \mathsf{c}$ in place of $\mathsf{a} = \lambda x_1, \ldots, x_k.\mathsf{c}$ to specify an API function:*

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{SymWrap}(h_key,\ h_w) \\ \quad w := \mathsf{getKey}(h_w,\ \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[X]); \\ \quad k := \mathsf{getKey}(h_key, X); \\ \quad \mathsf{return}\ \mathsf{enc}(k, w); \end{array}$$

Notice the use of type variable X to allow for any type from wrapped key. What is important is that X matches the payload type for the wrapping key, as specified in $\mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[X]$.

Semantics: Device keys are modelled by an handle-map $\mathsf{H} : g \mapsto (v, T)$ that is a partial mapping from the atomic (generated) values to pairs of key values and ground types. Key values are referred by their handles and we allow multiple handles to refer to the same value with eventually different types, for instance, $\mathsf{H}(g) = (v, T)$ and $\mathsf{H}(g') = (v, T')$. By allowing this we are able to deal with multiple devices considering all keys available to the API as a unique 'universal' device. This corresponds to a worst-case scenario in which attackers can simultaneously access all the existing hardware.

An API command c working on a memory M, with a handle-map H and type variable substitution σ is denoted by $\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c} \rangle$. Semantics is reported in Table II, where ϵ denotes the empty API. Assignment $x := e$ evaluates expression e on M and stores the result in variable x, noted $\mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v]$. In case x is not defined in M the domain of M is extended to include the new variable, otherwise the value stored in x is overwritten. Internal function $\mathsf{getKey}(y, T)$ takes the (ground) type T' of the key referred to by y and extends the present binding σ of type variables with a new binding σ' that makes T the same as T'. Binding σ' is minimal, as it only operates on the variables of $T\sigma$. With $\uplus$ we note the union of two disjoint substitutions.

Other rules are similar in spirit. Notice that genKey and setKey also modify the handle-map. The last rule is for API calls on an handle-map H: parameter values are assigned to variables of an empty memory M_ϵ, i.e., a memory with no variables mapped to values (recall that memories are partial functions); then, the API commands are executed and the return value is given as a result of the call. This is noted $\mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k) \downharpoonleft^{\mathsf{H},\mathsf{H}'} v$ where H' is the resulting handle map. Notice that at this API level we do not observe memories that are, in fact, used internally by the device to execute the function. The only exchanged data are the input parameters and the return value.

Example 4 (Semantics of symmetric key wrapping)**.** *To illustrate the semantics, we now show the transitions of the symmetric key wrapping command specified in Example 3. Suppose that the device associates the handle g to $(v, \mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL])$ and g' to $(v', \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[\mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL]])$. We consider a memory M where all the variables are set to zero except for h_key and h_w which store respectively g and g', i.e., $\mathsf{M} = \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[h_key \mapsto g, h_w \mapsto g']$. Let also assume that $X \notin dom(\sigma)$. Then it follows,*

$$\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, w := \mathsf{getKey}(h_w, \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[X])); \\ \qquad k := \mathsf{getKey}(h_key, X); \mathsf{return}\ \mathsf{enc}(k, w) \rangle \\ \to \langle \mathsf{M}[w \mapsto v'], \mathsf{H}, \sigma \uplus [X \mapsto \mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL]], \\ \qquad k := \mathsf{getKey}(h_key, X); \mathsf{return}\ \mathsf{enc}(k, w) \rangle \\ \to \langle \mathsf{M}[w \mapsto v', k \mapsto v], \mathsf{H}, \sigma \uplus [X \mapsto \mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL]], \\ \qquad \mathsf{return}\ \mathsf{enc}(k, w) \rangle \end{array}$$

which gives $\mathsf{SymWrap}(\mathsf{g}, \mathsf{g}') \downharpoonleft^{\mathsf{H},\mathsf{H}} enc(v, v')$ meaning that the value returned invoking the wrap command is thus the encryption of v under v'. Notice how X gets bound to the type transported by the wrapping key $\mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL]$ which then matches the type of v stored in H.

Attacker Model: We formalize the attacker in a classic Dolev-Yao style. The attacker knowledge $\mathcal{K}(V)$ deducible from a set of values V is defined as the least superset of V such that whenever $v, v' \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ then

1. $enc(v, v'), enc^a(v, v'), sig(v, v'), ek(v), vk(v) \in \mathcal{K}(V)$;
2. if $v = enc(v'', v')$ or $v = enc^a(v'', ek(v'))$ then $v'' \in \mathcal{K}(V)$;
3. if $v \neq enc(v'', v')$ then $dec(v, v') \in \mathcal{K}(V)$;
4. if $v \neq enc^a(v'', ek(v'))$ then $dec^a(v, v') \in \mathcal{K}(V)$;
5. if $v = sig(v'', v''')$ and $v' = vk(v''')$ then $v'' \in \mathcal{K}(V)$.

Given a handle map H, representing tokens, and an API $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathsf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{a}_n\}$, an attacker can invoke any API function providing any of the known values as a parameter and the returned value is added to its knowledge. Formally, an

$$\frac{e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := e\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{\mathsf{H}(\mathsf{M}(y)) = (v, T') \qquad T' = (T\sigma)\sigma' \qquad dom(\sigma') = var(T\sigma)}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := \mathsf{getKey}(y, T)\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{H}, \sigma \uplus \sigma', \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{g, g' \leftarrow \mathcal{G} \qquad T\sigma \text{ ground}}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := \mathsf{genKey}(T)\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto g], \mathsf{H}[g \mapsto (g', T\sigma)], \sigma, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{g \leftarrow \mathcal{G} \qquad T\sigma \text{ ground}}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := \mathsf{setKey}(y, T)\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto g], \mathsf{H}[g \mapsto (\mathsf{M}(y), T\sigma)], \sigma, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \varepsilon\rangle}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1; \mathsf{c}_2\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}_2\rangle} \qquad \frac{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}_1'\rangle}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1; \mathsf{c}_2\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}_1'; \mathsf{c}_2\rangle}$$

$$\frac{\mathsf{a} = \lambda x_1, \ldots, x_k.\mathsf{c} \quad \langle \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_1 \mapsto v_1 \ldots x_k \mapsto v_k], \mathsf{H}, \emptyset, \mathsf{c}\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{return}\ e\rangle \quad e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}'} v}{\mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k) \downarrow^{\mathsf{H},\mathsf{H}'} v}$$

Table II
API SEMANTICS

attacker configuration is represented as $\langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle$ and evolves as follows:

$$\frac{\mathsf{a} \in \mathcal{A} \qquad v_1, \ldots, v_k \in \mathcal{K}(V) \qquad \mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k) \downarrow^{\mathsf{H},\mathsf{H}'} v}{\langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}', V \cup \{v\}\rangle}$$

The initially knowledge of the adversary is given by an arbitrary subset $V_0 \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ and we consider an initial empty handle map H_0. In the following, we use the standard notation $\rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}}$ for multi-step reductions.

API security.: We define *confidential* and *secure* keys by inspecting the security levels stored in the handle map. Recall that the same key value can appear under multiple handles. A key that is always stored at a high confidential level should be regarded as *confidential*, however there is no guarantee that the key is not known by the attacker. For example, the attacker might succeed importing a key as confidential in the device. The device will regard it as high confidential but the value comes from the attacker. The situation is different for keys that are stored as high confidential and high integrity (HH). High integrity means that the key cannot come from the attacker. Typically these key are generated in the device or stored by a security officer in a secure environment. We expect these keys to be confidential in their entire life and we refer to them as *secure* keys.

Definition 5 (Confidential and secure keys)**.** *Let val be an atomic value and H a handle-map such that $val \notin dom(\mathsf{H})$. If val is such that $\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)$ implies $\ell_C(T) = H$ we say that val is* confidential *in H. If we additionally have that $T = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T^\star]$ we say that val is* secure *in H.*

The definition of API security follows.

Definition 6 (API Security)**.** *Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an API. We say that $\mathcal{A}$ is secure if for all reductions $\langle \mathsf{H}_0, V_0\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}', V'\rangle$ and for all atomic values val we have*

(1) $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V)$ and val is confidential in H implies $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V')$;
(2) val is secure in H implies $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V) \cup \mathcal{K}(V')$.

The above property is not enforced by the semantics as the following example illustrates.

Example 7. *Consider the following insecure API that takes a handle and leaks the corresponding key:*

$$\begin{array}{l}\mathsf{LeakKey}(h_key)\\ \quad k := \mathsf{getKey}(h_key, X);\\ \quad \mathsf{return}\ k;\end{array}$$

The key is copied into k and then returned, independently of the associated type. For example if the handle is associated to a secure $\mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[HH]$ key, the key value will be returned and leaked to the attacker, breaking API security definition.

In the next section we develop a type system that statically enforces the API security property.

III. TYPE SYSTEM

Expressions: In order to type expressions and commands we introduce a typing environment $\Gamma : x \mapsto T$ which maps variables to their respective types. We permit only a subset of key types in Γ (other types for keys are derived by these ones).

Definition 8 (Gamma well-formedness)**.** *Let $\Gamma : x \mapsto T$. We say that Γ is well-formed, written $\Gamma \vdash \diamond$, if whenever $\Gamma(x) = \mu\mathsf{K}^\ell[T]$ it holds:*

$$\frac{\Gamma(x) = T \quad \Gamma \vdash \diamond}{\Gamma \vdash_e x : T} \text{[var]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash_e e : T' \quad T' \leq T}{\Gamma \vdash_e e : T} \text{[sub]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T]}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{ek}(x) : \mathsf{EncK}^{L\ell_I}[T]} \text{[ek]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{SigK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T]}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{vk}(x) : \mathsf{VerK}^{L\ell_I}[T]} \text{[vk]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{enc}(e, x) : L\ell_I} \text{[enc]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell}[T] \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T'}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{dec}(e, x) : T} \text{[dec]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{EncK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{enc}^a(e, x) : L\ell_I} \text{[enca]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell}[T] \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T' \quad \ell_I(T') \neq H \implies T = LL}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{dec}^a(e, x) : T} \text{[deca]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{SigK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{sig}(e, x) : \ell_C(T)\ell_I} \text{[sig]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{VerK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T'}{\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{ver}(e, x) : T} \text{[ver]}$$

Table III
TYPING EXPRESSIONS

(1) $\mu \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$*;*
(2) $\ell \neq HH$ *implies* $T = LL$*.*

Type judgment for expressions is noted $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$ meaning that expression e is of type T under Γ. Typing rules are reported in Table III. Rules [*var*] and [*sub*] are standard and derive types directly from Γ (for variables) or via subtyping. Without loss of generality we will assume that [*sub*] is never applied more than once in a sequence, that is, given the sequence $T_1 \leq T_2, \ldots, T_{n-1} \leq T_n$, we could always substitute this by a single application with $T_1 \leq T_n$. Rules [*ek*] and [*vk*] derive the types for encryption and verification keys, respectively from decryption and signature ones, by changing the confidentiality to L. In fact, these keys can be be safely made public. Rule [*enc*] encrypts the result of an expression of type T, as required by the key type. The ciphertext has low confidentiality and the same integrity level as the encryption key. Symmetric decryption [*dec*] gives the original type T to the plaintext. Rules [*enca*] and [*deca*] are similar but asymmetric decryption gives type LL to the plaintext unless the ciphertext has high integrity. In fact, since encryption key is public the plaintext might come by the attacker. This is not the case only when the ciphertext has high integrity. Finally, rule [*sig*] and [*ver*] behave similarly but signature has the same confidentiality level as the signed expression. This is due to the fact that our verification function recovers the signed message from the signature. In order to protect its confidentiality we have to preserve the confidentiality level in the signature.

$$\frac{\Gamma(x) = T \quad \Gamma \vdash_e e : T}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := e} \text{[assign]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_1 \quad \Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_2}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_1; \mathsf{c}_2} \text{[seq]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma(x) = T \quad \Gamma \vdash_e y : LL}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := \mathsf{getKey}(y, T)} \text{[getkey]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma(x) = LL}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := \mathsf{genKey}(T)} \text{[genkey]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma(x) = LL \quad \Gamma \vdash_e y : T}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := \mathsf{setKey}(y, T)} \text{[setkey]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash_e e : LL}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{return}\ e} \text{[return]}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash_e x_1 : LL \quad \ldots \quad \Gamma \vdash_e x_k : LL \quad \Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \lambda x_1, \ldots, x_k.\mathsf{c}} \text{[function]}$$

$$\frac{\forall \mathsf{a} \in \mathcal{A} \quad \Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{a}}{\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathcal{A}} \text{[API]}$$

Table IV
TYPING APIS

APIs: We now type APIs via the judgment $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}$ meaning that c is well-typed under Γ. The judgment is formalized in Table IV. Rules [*assign*] and [*seq*] are standard, and they amount to recursively type the expression and the sequential sub-part of a program, respectively. Rule [*getkey*] retrieves a key of type T from the device and assigns it to a variable of the same type; rules [*genkey*] and [*setkey*] store keys and return a LL handle. Rules [*return*] and [*function*] state that the return value and the parameter of an API call must be untrusted. In fact they are the interface to the external, possibly malicious users. Finally, by rule [*API*] we have that an API is well-typed if all of its functions are well-typed.

Example 9. *Let us consider again the API in Example 3:*

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{SymWrap}(h_key,\ h_w) \\ \quad w := \mathsf{getKey}(h_w,\ \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[X]); \\ \quad k := \mathsf{getKey}(h_key, X); \\ \quad \mathsf{return}\ \mathsf{enc}(k, w); \end{array}$$

In order to type the API we have to type all parameters as LL *(rule [function]). Thus we let*

$$\Gamma(h_key) = \Gamma(h_w) = LL$$

Now by applying rule [getkey] twice we also set

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \Gamma(w) & = & \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[X] \\ \Gamma(k) & = & X \end{array}$$

Under this Γ we can apply rule [enc] and type $\mathsf{enc}(k,w)$ as LH, since the encryption key w has high integrity. By rule [sub] we can type $\mathsf{enc}(k,w)$ as LL which allows us to typecheck the return command, completing the typing.

A. Type soundness

In order to track the value integrity at run-time we define a notion of value well-formedness. This judgment is based on a mapping $\Theta : val \mapsto T$ from atomic values to ground types that satisfies the following conditions:

$$\begin{array}{l}\Theta(val) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] \text{ implies } \mu \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\} \\ \Theta(val) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] \text{ and } \ell \neq HH \text{ then } T = LL\end{array} \quad (2)$$

Rules are given in Table V and follow very closely the ones for expressions defined in Table III.

With this definition we may now characterize the properties of types associated with values that represent keys.

Proposition 10. *Let $\Theta(val) = T$ and $\Theta \models_v val : T'$. Then $T \leq T'$.*

Proposition 11. *Suppose that $v \neq dec(v', v''), dec^a(v', v'')$ and that $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$. Then*

1) *if $\ell = HH$ then v is atomic and $\Theta(v) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$;*
2) *if $\mu \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$ then $\ell = HH$ or $T = LL$;*
3) *if $\mu \in \{\mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Ver}\}$ then $\ell = LH$ or $T = LL$.*

Proposition 12. *Suppose that $v \neq dec(v', v''), dec^a(v', v'')$, and that $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$, and $\mu, \mu' \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$.*

Then $T = T'$. Moreover

(1) if $\ell = HH$, then $\ell = \ell' = HH$ and $\mu = \mu'$;

(2) if $\ell = \ell' = LL$ then $T = T' = LL$.

Proposition 13. *Suppose that $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$, and $\mu, \mu' \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$. Then $T = T'$. Moreover if $v \neq dec(v_1, v_2), dec^a(v_1, v_2)$ we also have*

(1) if $\ell = HH$, then $\ell = \ell' = HH$ and $\mu = \mu'$;

(2) if $\ell = \ell' = LL$ then $T = T' = LL$.

We now define when a typing-environment Γ and a well-formedness function Θ are correct with respect to a particular memory M, a handle-map H, and a set of atomic values $\mathsf{V_{ok}}$.

Definition 14 (Well-formedness)**.** $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V_{ok}}$ *if*

- $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash_{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}$, *i.e.,* $\mathsf{M}(x) = v$, $\Gamma(x) = T$ *implies* $\Theta \models_v v : T\sigma$*; and*
- $\Theta \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}$, *i.e.,* $\mathsf{H}(v') = (v, T)$ *implies* $\Theta \models_v v : T$*;*
- $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V_{ok}}$, *i.e.,* $val \in \mathsf{V_{ok}}$ *then* $\exists g.\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)$ *and* $\Theta(val) = T$.

Having defined the properties of keys and the notion of well-formed memory and handle-maps we characterize which values an adversary may derive. We show that with the rules from Section II, given a set of values of type LL an attacker can only derive values of type LL. Intuitively, having type LL, or LH via subtyping, is a necessary condition for a well-formed value to be deducible by the attacker.

Proposition 15. *Let Θ be a well-formedness mapping and v be a set of values such that $\Theta \models_v v : LL$. Then, $v \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ implies $\Theta \models_v v : LL$.*

It is important that the type of expressions and the type of their corresponding values are consistent at runtime. The next Proposition shows that when evaluating an expression with ground type T in a well-formed memory, the type of the returned value is also T. Recall that the range of Θ are only the ground types whereas the range of Γ are all types. We thus need to have a map σ that accounts for this.

Proposition 16. *Let $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$, $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$, and σ a map such that $T^{\star}\sigma$ is ground for any type $T^{\star}$ in the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$. If $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash_{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}$ then it holds $\Theta \models_v v : T\sigma$.*

We are now ready to prove our subject-reduction Theorem that states that well-typed programs remain well-typed at run-time and preserve memory and handle-map well-formedness.

Theorem 17. *Let $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V_{ok}}$ and $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}$. If $\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}'\rangle$ then*

(i) *if $\mathsf{c}' \neq \varepsilon$ then $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}'$;*

(ii) *$\exists \Theta' \supseteq \Theta$ such that $\Gamma, \Theta', \sigma' \vdash \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \mathsf{V_{ok}}'$, where $\mathsf{V_{ok}}' = \mathsf{V_{ok}} \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}') \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}).\mathsf{H}'(g) = (val, T)\} \setminus ran[\mathsf{M}]$;*

Let $\mathsf{V_{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, V) = \{val \mid \exists g.\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)\} \setminus \mathcal{K}(V)$.

Lemma 18. *Let $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathcal{A}$ and $\langle \mathsf{H}_0, V_0\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle$.*

Then, there exists Θ such that $\Theta \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}$, $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ for each $v \in V$, and $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V_{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, V)$.

Proof: We show the result by induction on the length of the attack.

The base case is when $\mathsf{H} = \emptyset$ and $V = V_0$. Given that H is empty and $V = V_0 \subseteq \mathcal{C}$, defining $\Theta(v) = LL$ for all $v \in V_0$ gives us immediately the result.

Consider now that $\langle \mathsf{H}_0, V_0\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}_n, V_n\rangle \rightsquigarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle$. By IH $\exists \Theta_n$ such that

- $\Theta_n \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}_n$,
- $\Theta_n \models_v v : LL$ for all $v \in V_n$, and
- $\Theta_n \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}_n, \mathsf{V_{ok}}(\mathsf{H}_n, V_n)$.

$$\frac{\mathsf{a} \in \mathcal{A} \qquad v_1, \ldots, v_k \in \mathcal{K}(V_n) \qquad \mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k) \downarrow^{\mathsf{H}_n, \mathsf{H}} v}{\langle \mathsf{H}_n, V_n\rangle \rightsquigarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}, V_n \cup \{v\}\rangle}$$

Looking at the last step there was a call to some $\mathsf{a} \in \mathcal{A}$ with $v_1, \ldots, v_k \in \mathcal{K}(V_n)$, $\mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k) \downarrow^{\mathsf{H}_n, \mathsf{H}} v$, and $V = V_n \cup \{v\}$.

$$\frac{\Theta(val) = T}{\Theta \models_v val : T} \text{[atom]} \qquad \frac{\Theta \models_v v : T' \quad T' \leq T}{\Theta \models_v v : T} \text{[sub]}$$

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T]}{\Theta \models_v ek(v) : \mathsf{EncK}^{L\ell_I}[T]} \text{[ek]} \qquad \frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SigK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T]}{\Theta \models_v vk(v) : \mathsf{VerK}^{L\ell_I}[T]} \text{[vk]}$$

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Theta \models_v v' : T}{\Theta \models_v enc(v', v) : L\ell_I} \text{[enc]} \qquad \frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell}[T] \quad \Theta \models_v v' : T' \quad v' \neq enc(v'', v)}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : T} \text{[dec]}$$

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{EncK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Theta \models_v v' : T}{\Theta \models_v enc^a(v', v) : L\ell_I} \text{[enca]} \qquad \frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SigK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T] \quad \Theta \models_v v' : T}{\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : \ell_C(T)\ell_I} \text{[sig]}$$

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell}[T] \quad \Theta \models_v v' : T' \quad v' \neq enc^a(v'', ek(v)) \quad \ell_I(T') \neq H \implies T = LL}{\Theta \models_v dec^a(v', v) : T} \text{[deca]}$$

Table V
VALUE WELL-FORMEDNESS

Given that by IH $\Theta_n \models_v v : LL$ for all $v \in V_n$ and $v_1, \ldots, v_k \in \mathcal{K}(V_n)$ we get by Proposition 15 that $\Theta_n \models_v v_i : LL$.

Unfolding the operation call we get that $\mathsf{a} = \lambda x_1 \ldots x_k.\mathsf{c}$, $\langle \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i], \mathsf{H}_n, \emptyset, \mathsf{c}\rangle \to \langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{return}\ e\rangle$ and $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$, and consequently form $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{a}$ we get $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e x_i : L{\ell_I}_i$ that by [*sub*] implies $\Gamma \vdash_e x_i : LL$.

Now, from $\mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i](x_i) = v_i$, $\Gamma \vdash_e x_i : LL$, and $\Theta_n \models_v v_i : LL$ we get by definition of well-formedness $\Gamma, \Theta_n, \emptyset \vdash_{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i]$ that together with IH imply $\Gamma, \Theta_n, \emptyset \vdash \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i], \mathsf{H}_n, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}_n, V_n)$.

We can hence apply Theorem 17 to $\langle \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i], \mathsf{H}_n, \emptyset, \mathsf{c}\rangle \to \langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{return}\ e\rangle$ and obtain

(i) $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{return}\ e$ and consequently $\Gamma \vdash_e e : L\ell_I$;

(ii) $\exists \Theta \supseteq \Theta_n$ such that $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}$ where $\mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}} = \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_n) \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}) \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}_n).\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)\} \setminus ran[\mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i]]$

From (ii) it follows immediately that $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash_{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}$, $\Theta \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}$, and $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}$.

Given that $\Gamma \vdash_e e : L\ell_I$, $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$, and $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash_{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}$, we apply Proposition 16 to get $\Theta \models_v v : L\ell_I$ and by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v : LL$.

Finally since by IH $\Theta_n \models_v v : LL$ for all $v \in V_n$, $\Theta_n \subseteq \Theta$ and $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ we get that $\Theta \models_v v' : LL$ for all $v' \in V_n \cup \{v\} = V$.

Since $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}$ and $\mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}_n, V_n) \subseteq \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}$ we have $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}_n, V_n)$ (see Table VI) ∎

Lemma 19. *Let $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathcal{A}$ and $\langle \mathsf{H}_0, V_0\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}', V'\rangle$. Then, there exists Θ, Θ' with $\Theta \subseteq \Theta'$ such that*

- $\Theta \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}$ *and* $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ *for each* $v \in V$*, and*
- $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, V)$

and

- $\Theta' \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}'$ *and* $\Theta' \models_v v : LL$ *for each* $v \in V'$*, and*
- $\Theta' \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}', \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}', V')$

Proof: Direct from the Lemma 18 ∎

We can now state the main result of the paper: well-typed APIs are secure, according to Definition 6.

Theorem 20. *Let $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathcal{A}$. Then $\mathcal{A}$ is secure.*

Proof: Suppose that $\langle \mathsf{H}_0, V_0\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}} \langle \mathsf{H}', V'\rangle$ and val is an atomic value confidential in H, that is, for all g where $\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)$ then $T = H\ell_I$ or $T = \mu\mathsf{K}^{H\ell_I}[T^\star]$.

By Lemma 19 one has that there exists $\Theta \subseteq \Theta'$ such that

- $\Theta \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}$ and $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ for each $v \in V$, and
- $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, V)$
- $\Theta' \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}'$ and $\Theta' \models_v v : LL$ for each $v \in V'$, and
- $\Theta' \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}', \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}', V')$

Since val is in the handle-map H and by hypothesis $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V)$ we have that $val \in \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, V)$. Now since $\Theta \Vdash_{\mathsf{V}} \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H}, V)$ we have that $\exists g.\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)$ and $\Theta(val) = T$. Since val is confidential we have that $\Theta(val) = \Theta'(val) = H\ell_I$ or $\mu\mathsf{K}^{H\ell_I}[T^\star]$ which imply by Proposition 10 that $\Theta' \not\models_v val : LL$ (otherwise $H\ell_I \leq LL$ or $\mu\mathsf{K}^{H\ell_I}[T^\star] \leq LL$). Applying now Proposition 15 one gets $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V')$.

Suppose now that val is an atomic value secure in H, that is, for all g where $\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)$ then $T = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T^\star]$. Then by $\Theta \models_{\mathsf{H}} \mathsf{H}$ we have $\Theta \models_v val : \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T^\star]$. By Proposition 10 and definition of $\leq$ we have that $\Theta(val) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T^\star]$. Now, one can see that $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V)$ otherwise we would have by Proposition 15 $\Theta \models_v val : LL$ which is not possible by Proposition 10. We now apply the same reasoning as in the first case to conclude that $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V')$. ∎

$$
\begin{array}{rl}
\mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}} = & \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H},\mathsf{V}_n) \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}) \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}_n).\mathsf{H}(g) = (val,T)\} \setminus ran[\mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_i \mapsto v_i]] \\
= & \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H},\mathsf{V}_n) \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}) \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}_n).\mathsf{H}(g) = (val,T)\} \setminus \{v_1,\dots,v_k\} \\
\supseteq & \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H},\mathsf{V}_n) \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}) \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}_n).\mathsf{H}(g) = (val,T)\} \setminus \mathcal{K}(V_n) \\
= & \{val \mid \exists g.\mathsf{H}_n(g) = (val,T)\} \setminus \mathcal{K}(V_n) \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}) \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}_n).\mathsf{H}(g) = (val,T)\} \setminus \mathcal{K}(V_n) \\
= & (\{val \mid \exists g.\mathsf{H}_n(g) = (val,T)\} \cup \{val \mid \exists g \in dom(\mathsf{H}) \setminus dom(\mathsf{H}_n).\mathsf{H}(g) = (val,T)\}) \setminus \mathcal{K}(V_n) \\
\supseteq & \{val \mid \exists g.\mathsf{H}(g) = (val,T)\} \setminus \mathcal{K}(V) \\
= & \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{ok}}(\mathsf{H},V)
\end{array}
$$

Table VI

AUXILIARY TABLE FOR PROOF OF LEMMA 18

IV. SECURE IMPLEMENTATION

We now modify the language in order to get closer to realistic implementations of the APIs. So far, we have assumed that keys are typed and types are stored in the devices together with the key values. This abstraction allows to statically prove security but needs to be related to actual APIs implementation in order to be useful. To this aim, we give a new semantics in which keys are stored together with *key properties*, i.e. concrete data which specify the roles of the key, its security level, the cryptographic algorithm, the key length, etc. We will give a general theorem stating that whenever we assign types to key properties in a unique way, security results are preserved in the new, concrete semantics.

Key properties: Properties of keys have the following syntax:

$$P ::= Y \mid p \mid p[P]$$

where Y is a property variable that will be bound at runtime, p is a value specifying the actual properties, $p[P]$ represents a key with properties p which can perform cryptographic operations on keys with properties P. It typically happens that many concrete properties are treated the same when authorizing cryptographic operations. For example, an encryption key is always allowed to perform encryption independently of its actual length or of the algorithm it is bound to. Of course these details are important when actual cryptography takes place but they are irrelevant in our analysis. For this reason, we assume to have an equivalence relation on concrete properties $\equiv$ that relates properties which make the APIs behave the same way.

Concrete syntax and semantics: We define a more concrete syntax which stores concrete key properties instead of types. In the code, only internal functions are affected:

$$\mathsf{f} \quad ::= \quad \mathsf{getKey}(y,P) \mid \mathsf{genKey}(P) \mid \mathsf{setKey}(y,P)$$

The semantics is reported in Table VII and is close to the one of Table II. There are however some important differences: $\mathsf{H_p}$ notes the new concrete handles that store actual key properties; ρ is a substitution of key property variables into key properties; all occurrences of types T are replaced by key properties P; in getKey, when we match properties, we also allow for equivalent key properties.

Attacker configurations for a concrete API $\mathcal{A}_p = \{\mathsf{a}_1,\dots,\mathsf{a}_n\}$ evolves by making calls on the concrete semantics:

$$\frac{\mathsf{a} \in \mathcal{A}_p \qquad v_1,\dots,v_k \in \mathcal{K}(V) \qquad \mathsf{a}(v_1,\dots,v_k) \downarrow_p^{\mathsf{H},\mathsf{H}'} v}{\langle \mathsf{H_p}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow_{\mathcal{A}_p} \langle \mathsf{H}'_\mathsf{p}, V \cup \{v\}\rangle}$$

Definition 21 (Typed key properties)**.** *Key properties are typed if there exists a mapping $\mathcal{T}$ from key properties to types such that*

(1) $P_1 \equiv P_2$ implies $\mathcal{T}(P_1) = \mathcal{T}(P_2)$;

(2) $\mathcal{T}(P\rho) = \mathcal{T}(P)\mathcal{T}(\rho)$ for all substitutions ρ, where $\mathcal{T}(\rho)$ is defined as $\mathcal{T}(\rho)(\mathcal{T}(Y)) = \mathcal{T}(\rho(Y))$;

Notice that definition of $\mathcal{T}(\rho)$ implicitly assumes that $\mathcal{T}$ maps different property variables into different type variables. This also implies that $\mathcal{T}(\rho \uplus \rho') = \mathcal{T}(\rho) \uplus \mathcal{T}(\rho')$.

Typing of key properties is extended to handles and commands by simply applying it to all occurrences of key properties.

Definition 22 (Connecting concrete and typed semanics)**.** *Given a mapping $\mathcal{T}$ from key properties to types we apply it to handles, commands and substitutions as follows:*

- *$\mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H_p})(v) = (v', \mathcal{T}(P))$ whenever $\mathsf{H_p}(v) = (v', P)$;*
- *for internal functions, we have*

$$
\begin{array}{rcl}
\mathcal{T}(\mathsf{getKey}(y,P)) & = & \mathsf{getKey}(y,\mathcal{T}(P)) \\
\mathcal{T}(\mathsf{genKey}(P)) & = & \mathsf{genKey}(\mathcal{T}(P)) \\
\mathcal{T}(\mathsf{setKey}(y,P)) & = & \mathsf{setKey}(y,\mathcal{T}(P))
\end{array}
$$

All other commands just apply $\mathcal{T}$ to subcommands, recursively.

Theorem 23 (Semantic correspondence)**.** *Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a typing for key properties, and pick the same fresh number generator $\mathcal{G}$ for the two semantics. Then,*

$$\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, \mathsf{c}\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}'_\mathsf{p}, \rho', \mathsf{c}'\rangle$$

implies

$$\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H_p}), \mathcal{T}(\rho), \mathcal{T}(\mathsf{c})\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H}'_\mathsf{p}), \mathcal{T}(\rho'), \mathcal{T}(\mathsf{c}')\rangle$$

Proof: By easy induction on the length of the derivation of the two reductions, applying Definitions 21 and 22. ∎

As a consequence we have that all the attacks in the concrete semantics are mimicked in the typed one:

$$\frac{e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, x := e\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{\mathsf{H_p}(\mathsf{M}(y)) = (v, P') \qquad P' \equiv (P\rho)\rho' \qquad dom(\sigma') = var(P\rho)}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, x := \mathsf{getKey}(y, P)\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{H_p}, \rho \uplus \rho', \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{g, g' \leftarrow \mathcal{G} \qquad P\rho \text{ ground}}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, x := \mathsf{genKey}(P)\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto g], \mathsf{H_p}[g \mapsto (g', P\rho)], \rho, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{g \leftarrow \mathcal{G} \qquad P\rho \text{ ground}}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, x := \mathsf{setKey}(y, P)\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto g], \mathsf{H_p}[g \mapsto (\mathsf{M}(y), P\rho)], \rho, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

$$\frac{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, \mathsf{c}_1\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H_p}', \rho', \varepsilon\rangle}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, \mathsf{c}_1; \mathsf{c}_2\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H_p}', \rho', \mathsf{c}_2\rangle} \qquad \frac{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, \mathsf{c}_1\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H_p}', \rho', \mathsf{c}_1'\rangle}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H_p}, \rho, \mathsf{c}_1; \mathsf{c}_2\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H_p}', \rho', \mathsf{c}_1'; \mathsf{c}_2\rangle}$$

$$\frac{\mathsf{a} = \lambda x_1, \ldots, x_k.\mathsf{c} \quad \langle \mathsf{M}_\epsilon[x_1 \mapsto v_1 \ldots x_k \mapsto v_k], \mathsf{H_p}, \emptyset, \mathsf{c}\rangle \rightarrow_p \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H_p}', \rho', \mathsf{return}\ e\rangle \quad e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}'} v}{\mathsf{a}(v_1, \ldots, v_k) \downarrow_p^{\mathsf{H_p}, \mathsf{H_p}'} v}$$

Table VII
API CONCRETE SEMANTICS

Corollary 24. *Let* $\langle \mathsf{H_p}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}_p} \langle \mathsf{H}'_\mathsf{p}, V'\rangle$. *Then we have* $\langle \mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H_p}), V\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{T}(\mathcal{A}_p)} \langle \mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H}'_\mathsf{p}), V'\rangle$

Definition of security can be done through the type associated to concrete key properties:

Definition 25 (Concrete API Security)**.** *Let* $\mathcal{A}_p$ *be a concrete API. We say that* $\mathcal{A}_p$ *is secure if for all reductions* $\langle \mathsf{H}_0, V_0\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}_p} \langle \mathsf{H_p}, V\rangle \rightsquigarrow^*_{\mathcal{A}_p} \langle \mathsf{H}'_\mathsf{p}, V'\rangle$ *and for all atomic values* val *we have*

(1) $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V)$ *and* val *is confidential in* $\mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H_p})$ *implies* $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V')$*;*

(2) val *is secure in* $\mathcal{T}(\mathsf{H_p})$ *implies* $val \notin \mathcal{K}(V) \cup \mathcal{K}(V')$.

Thus, all security results hold on the concrete semantics based on actual key properties once an appropriate typing $\mathcal{T}$ is provided.

Theorem 26. *Let* $\Gamma \vdash_\mathsf{c} \mathcal{T}(\mathcal{A}_p)$. *Then* $\mathcal{A}_p$ *is secure.*

Proof: This is a direct consequence of Corollary 24. ■

V. CASE STUDY: PKCS#11 V2.20

PKCS#11, also known as Cryptoki, defines a widely adopted API for cryptographic tokens [16]. It provides access to cryptographic functionalities while, in principle, providing some security properties. More specifically, the value of keys stored on a PKCS#11 device and tagged as *sensitive* should never be revealed outside the token, even when connected to a compromised host. Unfortunately, PKCS#11 is known to be vulnerable to attacks that break this property [3], [8], [11].

There may be various *objects* stored in the token, such as cryptographic keys and certificates. Objects are referenced via *handles*. The value of a key is one of the *attributes* of the enclosing object. There are other attributes to specify the various roles a key can assume: each different API call can, in fact, require a different role. For example, decryption keys are required to have attribute `CKA_DECRYPT` set, while key-encrypting keys, i.e., keys used to encrypt other keys, must have attribute `CKA_WRAP` set.

PKCS#11 key properties: Properties and capabilities of keys are described by set of *attributes*. When a certain attribute is contained in the set of key properties p we will say that the attribute is set, it is unset otherwise. In our analysis we consider the following subset of PKCS#11 attributes:

- `CKA_CLASS` (C) The object class which can be one among
  - `CKO_PUBLIC_KEY` ($PubK$) Public keys;
  - `CKO_PRIVATE_KEY` ($PrivK$) Private keys;
  - `CKO_SECRET_KEY` ($SecK$) Secret (symmetric) keys;
- `CKA_SENSITIVE` (H) The key should never revealed out of the token;
- `CKA_ENCRYPT` (E) The key can be used to encrypt data;
- `CKA_DECRYPT` (D) The key can be used to decrypt data;
- `CKA_SIGN` (S) The key supports signature;
- `CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER` (V) The key can be used to verify signatures, recovering data from the signature;
- `CKA_WRAP` (W) The key can be used to wrap another key stored in the token;
- `CKA_UNWRAP` (U) The key can be used to unwrap a key and import it in the token;
- `CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE` For wrapping keys (W set) specifies the attributes of any wrapped key. It is the P component of $p[P]$;
- `CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE` For unwrapping keys (U set) specifies the attributes of unwrapped key. For simplicity, we

will assume that wrap and unwrap templates coincide.

Example 27. *The key property $p = \{PubK, E\}$ represents a public key that can be used to encrypt data. The key property $p' = \{H, PrivK, U\}[\{H, SecK, E\}]$, instead, represents a private, sensitive, unwrapping key that can be used to import symmetric, sensitive, encryption keys.*

From properties to types: We now define the mapping $\mathcal{T}_{p11}$ of PKCS#11 key properties into types. It follows the informal description of attributes. For example, whenever E and $SecK$ are in p the key is typed as a symmetric key for encrypting data. Notice that this will force us to reduce the possible attribute assignments to sets with no *conflicting* attributes. For example, a key with $W, D, SecK$ set is dangerous as it can be used to wrap a sensitive key and then decrypt it as if it were simple data, leaking it outside the token. PKCS#11 is very flexible and allows for insecure operations, such as encrypting data under symmetric keys that are not sensitive and thus readable from anyone. We will discipline this more, by requiring that sensitive is always set.

The formal definition of $\mathcal{T}_{p11}$ follows. At each layer we specify the attributes to inspect in p. For example we first split depending on sensitive (H); then we inspect the class and so on. If the set of attributes match exactly one line of the table we have the corresponding type. If none or more than one match, we have no type and $\mathcal{T}_{p11}$ is undefined.

$$\mathcal{T}_{p11}(Y) = X_Y$$
$$\mathcal{T}_{p11}(p) = \mathcal{T}_{p11}(p[\{\}])$$
$$\mathcal{T}_{p11}(p[P]) =$$
$$= \begin{cases} H & \begin{cases} PrivK & \begin{cases} D & \mathsf{DecK}^{HL}[LL] \\ U & \mathsf{DecK}^{HH}[\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)] \\ S & \mathsf{SigK}^{HH}[\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)] \end{cases} \\ SecK & \begin{cases} E, D & \mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL] \\ W, U & \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)] \end{cases} \\ \neg C & HL \end{cases} \\ \neg H & \begin{cases} PubK & \begin{cases} E & \mathsf{EncK}^{LL}[LL] \\ W & \mathsf{EncK}^{LH}[\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)] \\ V & \mathsf{VerK}^{LH}[\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)] \end{cases} \\ \neg C & LL \end{cases} \end{cases}$$

Example 28. *Consider again the key property $p = \{PubK, E\}$ representing a public key that can be used to encrypt data. It matches $\neg H, PubK, E$ in the table giving type $\mathsf{EncK}^{LL}[LL]$, as expected. Key property $p' = \{H, PrivK, U\}[\{H, SecK, E\}]$ instead, represents a private, sensitive, unwrapping key that can be used to import symmetric, sensitive, encryption keys. From the table we get type $\mathsf{DecK}^{HH}[\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)]$ with $P = \{H, SecK, E\}$ which, in turns, gives $\mathsf{DecK}^{HH}[\mathsf{SymK}^{HL}[LL]]$.*

Proving security: We define the equivalence relation $\equiv_{p11}$ over key properties by simply equating properties that are mapped to the same types, i.e.,

$$P \equiv_{p11} P' \text{ iff } \mathcal{T}_{p11}(P) = \mathcal{T}_{p11}(P')$$

For example, $\{H, S\} \equiv \{H, PrivK, S\}$, since H and S are enough to univocally identify a private signature key. Moreover, if we consider an extra attribute A that is not relevant in our analysis we have that its addition does not affect the semantics, i.e., $p \cup \{A\} \equiv_{p11} p$ since $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(p \cup \{A\}) = \mathcal{T}_{p11}(p)$. Thus item 1 of Definition 21 trivially holds.

Now notice that, since $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(Y) = X_Y$ for all variables Y, $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P\rho)$ is the same as $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)$ where all the occurrences of variables X_Y are replaced by $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(Y\rho)$, which is exactly the definition of $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(\rho)$. Thus, $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(P\rho) = \mathcal{T}_{p11}(P)\mathcal{T}_{p11}(\rho)$. This is exactly what item 2 of Definition 21 requires.

We can thus apply Theorem 26 to prove security of PKCS#11 API specifications.

Example 29. *We revise once more the symmetric key wrapping example. We specify it using PKCS#11 attributes as follows:*

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{SymWrap}(h_key,\ h_w) \\ \quad w := \mathsf{getKey}(h_w, \{SecK, W\}[Y]); \\ \quad k := \mathsf{getKey}(h_key, Y); \\ \quad \mathsf{return\ enc}(k, w); \end{array}$$

We check that the wrapping key is symmetric ($SecK$) and is authorized to wrap (W). The transported key has an unspecified property Y that is matched in the second call to getKey. *We have that $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(\{SecK, W\}[Y]) = \mathsf{SymK}^{HH}[X_Y]$ and $\mathcal{T}_{p11}(Y) = X_Y$. The program translated under $\mathcal{T}_{p11}$ type-checks as we did in Example 9. Thus, by Theorem 26, this API is secure.*

VI. Conclusions

In the past few years, many attacks against cryptographic key management APIs have been presented and most of them were based on the improper use of cryptographic keys. In this paper, we proposed a simple imperative programming language for specifying strongly-typed APIs for the management of symmetric, asymmetric and signing keys. The main idea is to have expressive key types directly stored in the device, however independent of the implementation, that are matched at run-time when managing keys. We then developed a type-based analysis to prove the preservation of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive keys and have shown that this abstraction is expressive enough to code realistic key management APIs.

In order to code realistic key-management API's in our framework we defined a more concrete version of the language that allows for storing real key properties. We then show that if, under reasonable conditions, the concrete

properties are mapped into types, the general security results on typing are preserved.

As a case study, we have shown an encoding of PKCS#11 v2.20 by mapping the standard attributes into our types in a version that can be type-checked and thus proved secure.

VII. Acknowledgements

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Appendix

In this Appendix we present the proofs of the Propositions and Theorems Stated in the main body of the paper.

Proof of Proposition 10

Proof: Let us do the proof by induction on the depth of the derivation. Since val is atomic the last rule is either [*atom*] or [*sub*].

Case [*atom*]: then $T = T'$ and we are done.

Case [*sub*]: then $\Theta \models_v val : T''$ with $T'' \leq T'$. By IH $T \leq T'' \leq T'$ ■

Proof of Proposition 11

Proof: (1). Suppose that $\ell = HH$. We do this by induction on the depth of the derivation of $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$.

Case [*atom*]: in this case v is atomic and then $\Theta(v) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$ automatically.

Case [*sub*]: in this case $\Theta \models_v v : T'$ and $T' \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$. which by definition of $\leq$ implies that $T' = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$. As we assumed that we never apply rule [*sub*] uselessly we have to exclude this case.

Cases [*ek*] and [*vk*] are immediate because they derive keys with level $L\ell_I$.

Cases [*dec*] and [*deca*] are excluded by hypothesis. All the other are excluded because do not derive $\mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$.

(2). We do this by induction on the depth of the derivation of $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$.

Case [*atom*]: in this case v is atomic and then $\Theta(v) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ that by (2) imply that $\ell = HH$ or $T = LL$.

Case [*sub*]: in this case $\Theta \models_v v : T'$ and $T' \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$. Then by definition of $\leq$ we have $\ell = T = LL$.

Cases [*ek*] and [*vk*] are immediate because $\mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Ver} \notin \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$.

Cases [*dec*] and [*deca*] are excluded by hypothesis. All the other are excluded because do not derive $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$.

(3). We do this also by induction on the depth of the derivation of $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$.

Case [*atom*]: in this case v is atomic and then $\Theta(v) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ which is impossible by (2) as $\mu \notin \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\}$.

Case [*sub*]: in this case $\Theta \models_v v : T'$ and $T' \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$. Then by definition of $\leq$ we have $\ell = T = LL$.

Case [*ek*]: in this case we have $\Theta \models_v ek(v') : \mathsf{EncK}^{L\ell_I}[T]$ and consequently $\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C\ell_I}[T]$. Applying item (2) above we get that $\ell_C\ell_I = HH$ or $T = LL$, hence our claim follows.

Case [*vk*]: similar to above using Ver and Sig.

Cases [*dec*] and [*deca*] are excluded by hypothesis. All the other are excluded because do not derive $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$. ∎

Proof of Proposition 12

Proof: By Proposition 11(2) we have that $\ell = HH$ or $T = LL$ and $\ell' = HH$ or $T' = LL$.

(a) Suppose that $\ell = HH$. By Proposition 11(1) we have that v is atomic and $\Theta(v) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$.

Analyzing the last rule of the $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$ we can immediately see that it has to be either [*atom*] or [*sub*]. All the other rules do not derive $\mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$ or the resulting term is a decryption. Now, since we do not have useless applications of [*sub*] there is no $T' \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T]$ and so the only possible rule is [*atom*].

We will now perform a case analysis on the derivation of $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$. By the same reasons as above, the only possible rules are [*atom*] and [*sub*].

(i) Suppose that the last rule is [*atom*]. Then $\mu = \mu', \ell' = \ell = HH$, and $T' = T$;

(ii) Suppose that the last rule is [*sub*]. Then $\Theta \models_v v : T_1'$ with $T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$ and by $\leq$ we have $\ell' = T' = LL$ and we get $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{LL}[LL]$ which implies by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v : LL$. By Proposition 10 and since v is atomic, $\mu\mathsf{K}^{HH}[T] \leq LL$ which is impossible as the two are not related. Hence the derivation cannot be by [*sub*].

(b) Suppose now that instead $T = LL$. Again the only possible rules for $\Theta \models_v v : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ are [*atom*] and [*sub*].

Case [*atom*]: Then v is atomic and $\Theta(v) = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[LL]$.

If $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$ is also derived by [*atom*] we have $\mu = \mu', \ell' = \ell$, and $T' = T = LL$;

Suppose now that $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$ is derived by [*sub*] with $\Theta \models_v v : T_1'$ and $T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$. By definition of $\leq$ we have $T_1' \leq LL$ and $\ell' = T' = LL$ which implies $\Theta \models_v v : LL$. By Proposition 10 and since v is atomic, $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[LL] \leq LL$ which is possible only if $\ell \leq LL = \ell$.

Case [*sub*]: in this case we have $\Theta \models_v v : T_1$ with $T_1 \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[LL]$ that by subtyping implies $T_1 \leq LL$ and $\ell = LL$.

We will now perform a case analysis on the derivation of $\Theta \models_v v : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$. By the same reasons as above, the only possible rules are [*atom*] and [*sub*].

(i) Suppose that the last rule is [*atom*]. Then v is atomic and $\Theta(v) = \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$. By Proposition 10 $\mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T'] \leq LL$ which implies that $\ell' \leq LL$ and by (2) $T' = LL$.

(ii) Suppose that the last rule is [*sub*] and $\Theta \models_v v : T_1'$ with $T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$. Then by $\leq$ we have $T_1' \leq LL$ and $\ell' = T' = LL$.

∎

Proof of Proposition 13

Proof: For all $v'' \neq dec(v', v), dec^a(v', v)$ the result is true by Proposition 12.

For the case $v'' = dec(v', v)$ let us do an induction on the length of the derivation $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$. One immediately see that the last rule has to be [*dec*] or [*sub*]. Similarly for the case $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$

(a) Let us consider first the case [*dec*]. This implies that $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell^\star}[\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]]$. Let us analyze the possible cases for $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$.

Case [*dec*]: In this case $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell'^\star}[\mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']]$. By IH one has $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] = \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$.

Case [*sub*]: In this case we have

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell'^\star}[T_1'] \quad \ldots}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : T_1'}\,[\text{dec}] \qquad T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']}\,[\text{sub}]$$

By IH it follows that $\ell^\star = \ell'^\star$ and $\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T] = T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$ which implies by definition of $\leq$ that $\ell' = T' = LL$ and $\ell = T = LL$, and the result follows, or $\ell = LH$ and in this case $T = LL$ because we do not allow payloads different from LL for keys different from HH.

(b) Let us consider now the case when $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ is derived by [*sub*]. Analogously we have

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell^\star}[T_1] \quad \ldots}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : T_1}\,[\text{dec}] \qquad T_1 \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]}\,[\text{sub}]$$

and let us analyze the possible cases for $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$.

Case [*dec*]: In this case $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell'^\star}[\mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']]$. By IH one has $\ell'^\star = \ell^\star$ and $\mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T'] = T_1 \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ which implies by the same reasoning as before $\ell = T = LL = T'$ and $\ell' \leq LL$.

Case [*sub*]: In this case we have

$$\dfrac{\dfrac{\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell'^\star}[T_1'] \quad \ldots}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : T_1'}\,[\text{dec}] \qquad T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']}{\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']}\,[\text{sub}]$$

Since $T_1 \leq \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ and $T_1' \leq \mu'\mathsf{K}^{\ell'}[T']$ one has by definition of $\leq$ that $\ell = T = LL$ and $\ell' = T' = LL$ and the result follows.

The case for $v'' = dec^a(v', v)$ is analogous using Dec instead of Sym. ∎

Proof of Proposition 15

Proof: We do this proof by induction on the number of steps needed to derive $v \in \mathcal{K}(V)$.

Base case is when the derivation has length 0 hence $v \in V$. By hypothesis the result follows.

Suppose now that $v, v' \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ and by IH $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ and $\Theta \models_v v' : LL$. We will follow the cases from the definition of $\mathcal{K}(V)$.

(1) $enc(v', v), enc^a(v', v), sig(v', v), ek(v), vk(v) \in \mathcal{K}(V)$.

Case $enc(v', v)$: From $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ by [*sub*] one derives $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{LL}[LL]$ and by [*enc*] $\Theta \models_v enc(v', v) : LL$.

Case $enc^a(v', v)$: idem.

Case $sig(v', v)$: Analogous with Sig and rule [*sig*].

Case $ek(v)$: Applying [*sub*] to $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ we get $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{LL}[LL]$. By [*ek*] $\Theta \models_v ek(v) : \mathsf{EncK}^{LL}[LL]$. Applying again [*sub*] one gets $\Theta \models_v ek(v) : LL$.

Case $vk(v)$: Analogous with Sig and Ver and rule [*vk*].

(2) $v'' \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ because $v = enc(v'', v')$ or $v = enc^a(v'', ek(v'))$; want to show that $\Theta \models_v v'' : LL$.

Case $v = enc(v'', v')$: there are only two possibilities for $\Theta \models_v enc(v'', v') : LL$, [*enc*] or [*sub*].

Considering the case [*enc*] we get

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C L}[T''] \quad \Theta \models_v v'' : T''}{\Theta \models_v enc(v'', v') : LL}\ [\text{enc}]$$

From IH $\Theta \models_v v' : LL$ and by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{SymK}^{LL}[LL]$. By Proposition 13 one has $T'' = LL$ which implies $\Theta \models_v v'' : LL$.

Considering the case [*sub*] we get

$$\frac{\dfrac{\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C \ell_I(T')}[T''] \quad \Theta \models_v v'' : T''}{\Theta \models_v enc(v'', v') : T'}\ [\text{enc}] \qquad T' \leq LL}{\Theta \models_v enc(v'', v') : LL}\ [\text{sub}]$$

Again by IH and [*sub*] we get $\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{SymK}^{LL}[LL]$. By Proposition 13 one has $T'' = LL$ which implies $\Theta \models_v v'' : LL$.

Case $v = enc^a(v'', ek(v'))$: there are only two possibilities for $\Theta \models_v enc^a(v'', ek(v')) : LL$, [*enca*] or [*sub*].

Considering the case [*enca*] we get

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v ek(v') : \mathsf{EncK}^{\ell_C L}[T''] \quad \Theta \models_v v'' : T''}{\Theta \models_v enc^a(v'', ek(v')) : LL}\ [\text{enca}]$$

By Proposition 11(3) we have $\ell_C L = LH$ or $T'' = LL$. Since the former is not true, the latter proves our claim.

Considering now the case [*sub*] we get

$$\frac{\dfrac{\Theta \models_v ek(v') : \mathsf{EncK}^{\ell_C \ell_I(T')}[T''] \quad \Theta \models_v v'' : T''}{\Theta \models_v enc^a(v'', ek(v')) : T'}\ [\text{enca}] \qquad T' \leq LL}{\Theta \models_v enc^a(v'', ek(v')) : LL}\ [\text{sub}]$$

Again by Proposition 11(3) we have $\ell_C \ell_I(T') = LH$ or $T'' = LL$. The latter immediately proves our claim. For the former let us analyze the possible ways to have $\Theta \models_v ek(v') : \mathsf{EncK}^{LH}[T'']$. It is either by [*atom*], [*sub*] or [*ek*]. Case [*atom*] is not possible because $ek(v')$ is not atomic. Case [*sub*] leads to $\Theta \models_v ek(v') : T'$ for $T' \leq \mathsf{EncK}^{LH}[T'']$ which is impossible by definition of $\leq$. We are left with the case [*ek*] that tell us $\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C H}[T'']$. But by IH $\Theta \models_v v' : LL$ which implies by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v' : \mathsf{DecK}^{LL}[LL]$ and by Proposition 13 we also get $T'' = LL$.

(3) $dec(v', v) \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ and $v' \neq enc(v'', v)$; want to show that $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : LL$. By IH $\Theta \models_v v : LL$ and by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{LL}[LL]$. Applying [*dec*] we get $\Theta \models_v dec(v', v) : LL$.

(4) $dec^a(v', v) \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ and $v' \neq enc^a(v'', ek(v))$; want to show that $\Theta \models_v dec^a(v', v) : LL$. Similar as before with Dec and [*deca*] instead of Sym and [*dec*].

(5) $v'' \in \mathcal{K}(V)$ because $v' = sig(v'', v''')$ and $v = vk(v''')$; want to show that $\Theta \models_v v'' : LL$.

By IH we know that $\Theta \models_v sig(v'', v''') : LL$. There are only 3 hypothesis to derive $v' = sig(v'', v''')$: either by [*atom*], by [*sig*], or by [*sub*]. The first case, [*atom*], is not possible as $sig(v'', v''')$ is not atomic. The second, [*sig*], implies that $\Theta \models_v v'' : L{\ell_I}''$ and by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v'' : LL$. Let us finally consider the case [*sub*]. In this case we have that $\Theta \models_v sig(v'', v''') : T$ for some $T \leq LL$.

Looking now at the derivation of $\Theta \models_v sig(v'', v''') : T$ we know that it cannot be by [*atom*] because it is not atomic; cannot be by [*sub*] because we assumed we never apply rule [*sub*] twice in sequence; and so it can only be by [*sig*] which implies that $\Theta \models_v v'' : \ell_C(T){\ell_I}''$.

Now, if $T \leq LL$ we have $T = LL, LH, \mu\mathsf{K}^{LH}[T^\star]$, or $\mu\mathsf{K}^{LL}[T^\star]$ for some $T^\star$ which implies in any case that $\ell_C(T) = L$, hence $\Theta \models_v v'' : L{\ell_I}''$ that by [*sub*] proves our result. ∎

Proof of Proposition 16

Proof: By induction on the derivation $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$.

Base case [*var*] is immediate as by hypothesis $e = x$ with $\Gamma(x) = T$ and $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v = \mathsf{M}(x)$. By well-formedness of M we get $\Theta \models_v v : T\sigma$. By hypothesis $T\sigma$ is ground.

Inductive Step:

Case [*sub*]: By hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$ and $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$. By [*sub*] $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T'$ for some $T' \leq T$ and by hypothesis $T\sigma, T'\sigma$ are ground. By IH $\Theta \models_v v : T'\sigma$ and by Lemma 2 $T'\sigma \leq T\sigma$ and so by [*sub*] one has $\Theta \models_v v : T\sigma$.

Case [*ek*]: By hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{ek}(x) : \mathsf{EncK}^{L\ell_I}[T]$ and $\mathsf{ek}(x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} ek(v)$ with $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$. By [*ek*] we get $\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T]$ and by hypothesis $T\sigma$ is ground. By IH $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T\sigma]$ and by [*ek*] $\Theta \models_v ek(v) : \mathsf{EncK}^{L\ell_I}[T]\sigma$.

Case [*vk*]: Analogous replacing $\mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec}$, and [*ek*] by $\mathsf{Ver}, \mathsf{Sig}$, and [*vk*].

Case [*enc*]: By hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{enc}(e, x) : L\ell_I$ and $\mathsf{enc}(e, x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} enc(v', v)$ with $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v'$ and $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$. By [*enc*] we get $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T]$ and by hypothesis $T\sigma$ is ground. By IH $\Theta \models_v v' : T\sigma$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C \ell_I}[T\sigma]$ and by [*enc*] the result follows.

Case [*enca*]: Analogous to the case [*enc*].

Case [*dec*]: By hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{dec}(e, x) : T$ and by [*dec*] we get $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T''$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell}[T]$ with $T\sigma, T''\sigma$

ground by hypothesis. We have two cases:

(i) $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} enc(v', v)$ and $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$ and in this case $\mathsf{dec}(e, x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v'$. We want to show that $\Theta \models_v v' : T\sigma$.

By IH $\Theta \models_v enc(v', v) : T''\sigma$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$. Let us analyze the former derivation. It was either by [*enc*] or [*sub*] because $enc(v', v)$ is not atomic. In the former case we know that $\Theta \models_v v' : T'$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell_C \ell_I(T''\sigma)}[T']$ for some ground T'. Applying Proposition 13 to v we get $T\sigma = T'$ and so the result follows.

If one used [*sub*] then $\Theta \models_v enc(v', v) : T'''$ for some ground $T''' \leq T''\sigma$. Now, the only possibility for $\Theta \models_v enc(v', v) : T'''$ is by [*enc*] and so, applying the reasoning just used before now with $\Theta \models_v enc(v', v) : T'''$ instead of $T''\sigma$ the result follows.

(ii) $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v''$ with $v'' \neq enc(v', v)$ and in this case $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$ and $\mathsf{dec}(e, x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} dec(v'', v)$. In this case we want to show $\Theta \models_v dec(v'', v) : T\sigma$.

By IH $\Theta \models_v v'' : T''\sigma$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SymK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$ which by [*dec*] proves the result.

Case [*deca*]: By hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{dec}^a(e, x) : T$ and by [*deca*] we get $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T''$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell}[T]$ with $T\sigma, T''\sigma$ ground by hypothesis. We also have as side-condition that if $\ell_I(T'') \neq H$ then $T = LL$. We have two cases:

(i) $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} enc^a(v', ek(v))$ and $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$ and in this case $\mathsf{dec}^a(e, x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v'$. We want to show that $\Theta \models_v v' : T\sigma$.

By IH $\Theta \models_v enc^a(v', ek(v)) : T''\sigma$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$. Let us analyze the former derivation. It was either by [*enca*] or [*sub*] because $enc^a(v', ek(v))$ is not atomic.

[*enca*]: In this case we know that $\Theta \models_v v' : T'$ and $\Theta \models_v ek(v) : \mathsf{EncK}^{\ell_C \ell_I(T''\sigma)}[T']$ for some ground T'. We can now look at the possibilities for obtaining $ek(v)$ and see that we have again two cases: [*ek*] or [*sub*].

- for [*ek*] one derives $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell_C{}' \ell_I(T''\sigma)}[T']$ and applying Proposition 13 to v we get $T\sigma = T'$ and the result follows.
- for [*sub*] one derives $\Theta \models_v ek(v) : T'''$ for some ground $T''' \leq \mathsf{EncK}^{\ell_C \ell_I(T''\sigma)}[T']$. Since both these types are ground we have by $\leq$ that $T''' \leq LL$ and $\ell_C \ell_I(T''\sigma) = T' = LL$.

  Now, consider the side condition of rule [*deca*] mentioned above, if $T'' = X$ then by definition $\ell_I(T'') = L$; if $T'' \neq X$ then $\ell_I(T'') = \ell_I(T''\sigma) = L$. In either case the side-condition implies that $T = LL$ and so $\Theta \models_v v' : T' = LL = T = T\sigma$ as we wanted.

[*sub*]: in this case $\Theta \models_v enc^a(v', ek(v)) : T^\star$ for some ground $T^\star \leq T''\sigma$. Now, the only possibility for $\Theta \models_v enc^a(v', ek(v)) : T^\star$ is by [*enca*] and so, applying the reasoning just used above now with $\Theta \models_v enc^a(v', ek(v)) : T^\star$ instead of $T''\sigma$ the same argument follows up to the point in [*sub*] where we can show now that $T''' = \ell_C \ell_I(T^\star) = T' = LL$ rather than $T''' = \ell_C \ell_I(T''\sigma) = T' = LL$. However, given that $\ell_I(T^\star) = L$ and $T^\star \leq T''\sigma$ one can see analyzing all possible cases that $\ell_I(T''\sigma) = L$ and so we can continue with the same argument to obtain our result.

(ii) $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v''$ with $v'' \neq enc^a(v', ek(v))$ and $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v$ and $\mathsf{dec}^a(e, x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} dec^a(v'', v)$. In this case we want to show $\Theta \models_v dec^a(v'', v) : T\sigma$.

By IH $\Theta \models_v v'' : T''\sigma$ and $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{DecK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$ which by [*deca*] proves the result if the side condition $\ell_I(T''\sigma) \neq H \implies T\sigma = LL$ of [*deca*] is verified. Suppose that $\ell_I(T''\sigma) \neq H$, ie, $\ell_I(T''\sigma) = L$. We analyze the possible cases for T'':

- $T'' = X$ implies $\ell_I(T''\sigma) = L = \ell_I(X) = \ell_I(T'')$;
- $T'' = \ell$ implies $\ell_I(T''\sigma) = \ell_I(T'')$;
- $T'' = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T]$ implies $\ell_I(T''\sigma) = \ell_I(\mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T\sigma]) = \ell_I(\ell) = \ell_I(T'')$.

Hence $\ell_I(T''\sigma) = L$ implies $\ell_I(T'') = L$; by the side condition of $\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{dec}^a(e, x) : T$ we have $T = LL$; and finally $T\sigma = T = LL$.

Case [*sig*]: Analogous to the case [*enc*].

Case [*ver*]: By hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_e \mathsf{ver}(e, x) : T$ and by [*ver*] we have that $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T'$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e x : \mathsf{VerK}^{\ell}[T]$ and $\ell_C(T') = H \implies \ell_I(\ell) = H$ with $T'\sigma, T\sigma$ ground.

Since $\mathsf{ver}(e, x) \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v'$ we also have that $e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} sig(v', v)$ and $x \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} vk(v)$. We want to show that $\Theta \models_v v' : T\sigma$.

By IH $\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T'\sigma$ and $\Theta \models_v vk(v) : \mathsf{VerK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$. We now look at the possible derivations of $sig(v', v)$. It is either by [*sig*] or [*sub*] as $sig(v', v)$ is not atomic.

[*sig*]: Since $\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T'\sigma$ we have

$$\frac{\Theta \models_v v' : \ell_C(T'\sigma)\ell_I \quad \Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SigK}^{\ell_C \ell_I(T'\sigma)}[\ell_C(T'\sigma)\ell_I]}{\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T'\sigma} \text{ [sig]}$$

Now, from $\Theta \models_v vk(v) : \mathsf{VerK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$ we know that this could only be obtained either by [*vk*] or [*sub*] since $vk(v)$ is not atomic. Consider the first case [*vk*]. We have then that $\Theta \models_v v : \mathsf{SigK}^{\ell_C{}^\star \ell_I(\ell)}[T\sigma]$ which implies by Proposition 13 that $T\sigma = \ell_C(T'\sigma)\ell_I$ hence $\Theta \models_v v' : T\sigma$.

Consider now the case [*sub*]. In this case $\Theta \models_v vk(v) : T''$ for some ground $T'' \leq \mathsf{VerK}^{\ell}[T\sigma]$. This implies that $T'' \leq LL$ and $\ell = T\sigma = LL$ and applying the side-condition in the contra-positive way we have $\ell_C(T'\sigma) = \ell_C(T') = L$. Using this in the rule above we get $\Theta \models_v v' : L\ell_I$ and by [*sub*] $\Theta \models_v v' : LL = T\sigma$.

[*sub*]: Since $\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T'\sigma$ we have $\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T^\star$ for some ground $T^\star \leq T'\sigma$. Now, the only possibility for $\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T^\star$ is by [*sig*] and so, applying the reasoning just used above now with $\Theta \models_v sig(v', v) : T^\star$ instead of $T'\sigma$ the argument follows until the point where we still derive by the side-condition that $\ell_C(T'\sigma) = \ell_C(T') = L$ when we need instead that $\ell_C(T^\star) = L$ for the argument to go through. However, given that $\ell_C(T'\sigma) = L$ and $T^\star \leq T'\sigma$ one can analyze all possible cases and conclude that $\ell_C(T^\star) = L$ allowing us to substitute in the rule above $\Theta \models_v v' : \ell_C(T^\star)\ell_I$ by $L\ell_I$ and conclude the argument in the same way. ■

Proof of Proposition 17

Proof: Suppose that $\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}'\rangle$.

We prove (i) by induction on c. We analyze the only two rules where $\mathsf{c}' \neq \varepsilon$.

$$\frac{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \varepsilon\rangle}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1;\mathsf{c}_2\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}_2\rangle}$$

Since by hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_1;\mathsf{c}_2$ we have that $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_1$ and $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_2$ which automatically implies our result.

$$\frac{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}_1'\rangle}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \mathsf{c}_1;\mathsf{c}_2\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}', \mathsf{H}', \sigma', \mathsf{c}_1';\mathsf{c}_2\rangle}$$

In this second case, by IH $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_1'$ and by hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_2$ we have $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} \mathsf{c}_1';\mathsf{c}_2$.

Let us now address (ii) analyzing all the possible cases. We want to show that given

- $\mathsf{M}(x) = v$, $\Gamma(x) = T$ implies $\Theta \models_v v : T\sigma$; and
- $\mathsf{H}(v') = (v, T)$ implies $\Theta \models_v v : T$,
- $val \in \mathsf{V_{ok}}$ then $\exists g.\mathsf{H}(g) = (val, T)$ and $\Theta(val) = T$,

there is a $\Theta' \supseteq \Theta$ such that

(a) $\mathsf{M}'(x) = v$, $\Gamma(x) = T$ implies $\Theta \models_v v : T\sigma'$; and
(b) $\mathsf{H}'(v') = (v, T)$ implies $\Theta \models_v v : T$,
(c) $val \in \mathsf{V_{ok}}'$ then $\exists g.\mathsf{H}'(g) = (val, T)$ and $\Theta'(val) = T$,
(d) Θ' is well-defined, namely, it is a function, the image of Θ' only contains ground types, and verify conditions in (2).

Case $\mathsf{c} = x := e$:

$$\frac{e \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} v}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := e\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{H}, \sigma, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

Consider $\Theta' = \Theta$. Since by hypothesis $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := e$ we get $\Gamma(x) = T$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e e : T$ then by Proposition 16 we have $\Theta' \models_v v : T\sigma$. Since the only difference from M to M' is in $x \mapsto v$ and $\Theta' \models_v v : T\sigma$ (a) follows.

Since in this case $\mathsf{H}' = \mathsf{H}$ and $\Theta' = \Theta$, (b), (c), and (d) are immediate from the hypothesis.

Case $\mathsf{c} = x := \mathsf{getKey}(y, T)$:

$$\frac{\mathsf{H}(\mathsf{M}(y)) = (v, T') \qquad T' = (T\sigma)\sigma' \qquad dom(\sigma') = fv(T\sigma) \qquad T' \text{ ground}}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := \mathsf{getKey}(y, T)\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto v], \mathsf{H}, \sigma\sigma', \varepsilon\rangle}$$

Consider again $\Theta' = \Theta$. The only difference from M to M' is in $x \mapsto v$.

(a) Since $\mathsf{M}'(x) = v$ and by $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := \mathsf{getKey}(y, T)$ we get $\Gamma(x) = T$, what we want to show is that $\Theta' \models_v v : T\sigma\sigma'$. By hypothesis $\mathsf{H}(\mathsf{M}(y)) = (v, T')$ which implies $\Theta \models_v v : T'$ and by hypothesis $T' = T\sigma\sigma'$. Since $\Theta = \Theta'$ the result follows.

Again, since in this case $\mathsf{H}' = \mathsf{H}$ and $\Theta' = \Theta$, (b), (c), and (d) are immediate from the hypothesis.

Case $\mathsf{c} = x := \mathsf{genKey}(T)$:

$$\frac{g, g' \leftarrow \mathcal{G} \qquad T\sigma \text{ ground} \qquad T\sigma = \mu\mathsf{K}^{\ell}[T'] \implies \mu \in \{\mathsf{Sym}, \mathsf{Dec}, \mathsf{Sig}\} \wedge (\ell = HH \vee T' = LL)}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := \mathsf{genKey}(T)\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto g], \mathsf{H}[g \mapsto (g', T\sigma)], \sigma, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

Since g, g' are a freshly random atomic values, define $\Theta' = \Theta \cup \{g \mapsto LL, g' \mapsto T\sigma\}$.

(a) The only difference from M to M' is in $x \mapsto g$. Since $\mathsf{M}'(x) = g$ and by $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := \mathsf{genKey}(T)$ we get $\Gamma(x) = LL$, what we want to show is that $\Theta' \models_v g : LL$ which is true by construction.

(b) Now from H to H' the difference is $g \mapsto (g', T\sigma)$. We want to show then that $\Theta' \models_v g' : T\sigma$ which is also true by construction.

(c) Since the difference from H to H' is $g \mapsto (g', T\sigma)$, g' is atomic, and $g' \notin ran[\mathsf{M}]$ we have that $\mathsf{V_{ok}}' = \mathsf{V_{ok}} \cup \{g'\}$. By construction $\exists g.\mathsf{H}'(g) = (g', T\sigma)$ with $\Theta'(g') = T\sigma$.

To prove (d) notice that g, g' are fresh, LL and $T\sigma$ are ground by hypothesis, and by construction and side condition of the rule both LL and $T\sigma$ satisfy the conditions in (2).

Case $\mathsf{c} = x := \mathsf{setKey}(y, T)$:

$$\frac{g \leftarrow \mathcal{G} \qquad T\sigma \text{ ground}}{\langle \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}, \sigma, x := \mathsf{setKey}(y, T)\rangle \rightarrow \langle \mathsf{M}[x \mapsto g], \mathsf{H}[g \mapsto (\mathsf{M}(y), T\sigma)], \sigma, \varepsilon\rangle}$$

Since g is a freshly random atomic value, define $\Theta' = \Theta \cup \{g \mapsto LL\}$.

(a) The only difference from M to M' is in $x \mapsto g$. Since $\mathsf{M}'(x) = g$ and by $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathsf{c}} x := \mathsf{setKey}(y, T)$ we get $\Gamma(x) = LL$ and $\Gamma \vdash_e y : T$, what we want to show is that $\Theta' \models_v g : LL$ that is true by construction.

(b) Now from H to H' the difference is $g \mapsto (\mathsf{M}(y), T\sigma)$. We want to show then that $\Theta' \models_v \mathsf{M}(y) : T\sigma$. By Proposition 16 since $\Gamma \vdash_e y : T$ by typing, $y \downarrow^{\mathsf{M}} \mathsf{M}(y)$ by definition, and $\Gamma, \Theta, \sigma \vdash \mathsf{M}, \mathsf{H}$ by hypothesis one has $\Theta \models_v \mathsf{M}(y) : T\sigma$. Since $\Theta \subset \Theta'$ (b) follows.

(c) The difference from H to H' is $g \mapsto (\mathsf{M}(y), T\sigma)$ but $\mathsf{M}(y) \in ran(\mathsf{M})$ so $\mathsf{V_{ok}}' = \mathsf{V_{ok}}$ and the result follows by hypothesis;

To prove (d) notice that g is fresh, LL is ground, and LL satisfy the conditions in (2).

Case $\mathsf{c} = \mathtt{return}\ e$ has no transition associated.

Case $\mathsf{c} = \mathsf{c}_1;\mathsf{c}_2$: both cases follow directly from IH. ■